Journal of Financial Economics
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Выпуски:
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004
Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling
Journal of Financial Economics.
1976.
Vol. 3.
No. 4.
P. 305-360.
This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property
rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of
the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the `separation
and control' issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence
of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears these costs and why, and investigate
the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the
firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance
of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness
of markets problem.
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather
of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a
private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man,
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour,
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of
such a company.
