Journal of Financial Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Robert H. Litzenberger Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 71-99.
This paper examines the intraday market response to announcements of new equity issues. For fifteen minutes following the announcement, there is abnormally high volume and a -1.3% average return. There is also a small, but significant, negative average return in the hour before the announcement. Issue size, intended use of proceeds, and estimated profitability of new investment are uncorrelated with the announcement effect. After the issuance of new shares, there is a significant price recovery of 1.5%. This evidence is inconsistent with many theoretical rationales for the negative market reaction to new equity issue announcements.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. No. 20. P. 203-235.
In this paper, we derive conditions under which the simple majority voting rule for electing controlling management and one share-one vote constitute a socially optimal corporate governance rule. We also show that other majority rules and/or multiple classes of shares are not socially optimal. Finally we show that an entrepreneur would choose to "issue two securities, one with only cash flow claims and no votes and one with only votes and no cash flow claims, ff this were allowed. This scheme, regardless of the majority rule adopted, is not socially optimal.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 61-82.
Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.
Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Rene M. Stulz Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 20. P. 25-54.
This paper analyzes how managerial control of voting rights affects firm value and financing policies. It shows that an increase in the fraction of voting rights controlled by management decreases the probability of a successful tender offer and increases the premium offered if a tender offer is made. Depending on whether managerial control of voting rights is small or large, shareholders' wealth increases or falls when management strengthens its control of voting rights. Management can change the fraction of the votes it controls through capital structure changes, corporate charter amendments, and the acquisition of shareholder clienteles.
Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, E.Han Kim Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 3-40.
This paper documents that a successful tender offer increases the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by an average of 7.4%. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the process of competition for control of the target and empirical evidence that competition among bidding firms increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers, that the supply of target shares is positively sloped, and that changes in the legal/institutional environment of tender offers have had no impact on the total (percentage) synergistic gains created but have significantly affected their division between the stockholders of the target and acquiring firms.