Journal of Financial Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Nikos Vafeas Journal of Financial Economics. 1999. Vol. 53. No. 1. P. 113-142.
For 307 firms over the 1990–1994 period, autor finds that board meeting frequency is related to corporate governance and ownership characteristics in a manner that is consistent with contracting and agency theory. The annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value. This result is driven by increases in board activity following share price declines. Autor further finds that operating performance improves following years of abnormal board activity. These improvements are most pronounced for firms with poor prior performance and firms not engaged in corporate control transactions. Overall, his results suggest that board activity, measured by board meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker Journal of Financial Economics. 1999. No. 51. P. 371-406.
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically signifficant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder, Stewart C. Myers Journal of Financial Economics. 1999. Vol. 51. No. 2. P. 219-244.
This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an optimal debt ratio. We show that our tests have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses. The statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.