Journal of Financial Economics
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Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional
Investors [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. Starks
Journal of Financial Economics.
2000.
Vol. 57.
No. 2.
P. 275-305.
We study shareholder proposals across a period of substantial activity and 2nd
systematic differences both across sponsor identity and across time. To measure the
success of shareholder activism, we examine voting outcomes and short-term market
reactions conditioned on proposal type and sponsor identity. The voting analysis
documents that sponsor identity, issue type, prior performance and time period are
important influences on the voting outcome. Proposals sponsored by institutions or
coordinated groups appear to act as substitutes gaining substantially more support
than proposals sponsored by individuals. The nature of the stock market reaction,
while typically small, varies according to the issue and the sponsor identity.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Financial Economics.
2000.
Vol. 58.
No. 1-2.
P. 3-27.
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration
in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend
policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the
explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors,
are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders
of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement
across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their
consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We
argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance
and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered
financial systems.
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