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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Journal of Finance

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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 . 
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 22-06-2006
John Y. Campbell Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 4. P. 1515-1567. 
This paper surveys the field of asset pricing. The emphasis is on the interplay between theory and empirical work, and on the tradeoff between risk and return. Modern research seeks to understand the behavior of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) that prices all assets in the economy. The behavior of the term structure of real interest rates restricts the conditional mean of the SDF, while patterns of risk premia restrict its conditional volatility and factor structure. Stylized facts about interest rates, aggregate stock prices, and cross-sectional patterns in stock returns have stimulated new research on optimal portfolio choice, intertemporal equilibrium models, and behavioral finance.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит прикрепленный файл
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Ronald Balvers, Yangru Wu, Eric Gilliland Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 2. P. 745-772. 
For U.S. stock prices, evidence of mean reversion over long horizons is mixed, possibly due to lack of a reliable long time series. Using additional cross-sectional power gained from national stock index data of 18 countries during the period 1969 to 1996, we find strong evidence of mean reversion in relative stock index prices. Our findings imply a significantly positive speed of reversion with a half-life of three to three and one-half years. This result is robust to alternative specifications and data. Parametric contrarian investment strategies that fully exploit mean reversion across national indexes outperform buy-and-hold and standard contrarian strategies
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007
Charles M.C. Lee, Bhaskaran Swaminathan Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 5. P. 2017-2069. 
This study shows that past trading volume provides an important link between ‘momentum’ and ‘value’ strategies. Specifically, we find that firms with high (low) past turnover ratios exhibit many glamour (value) characteristics, earn lower (higher) future returns, and have consistently more negative (positive) earnings surprises over the next eight quarters. Past trading volume also predicts both the magnitude and persistence of price momentum. Specifically, price momentum effects reverse over the next five years, and high (low) volume winners (losers) experience faster reversals. Collectively, our findings show that past volume helps to reconcile intermediate-horizon ‘underreaction’ and long-horizon ‘overreaction’ effects
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006
David S. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. Stein Journal of Finance. 2000.  Vol. 55. No. 6. P. 2537-2565. 
We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию