Journal of Finance
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Government ownership of banks [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2006Murillo Campello Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 6. P. 2773-2805.
This paper looks at internal capital markets in financial conglomerates by comparing the responses of small subsidiary and independent banks to monetary policy. I find that internal capital markets in financial conglomerates relax the credit constraints faced by smaller bank affiliates. Further analysis indicates that those markets lessen the impact of Fed policies on bank lending activity. The paper also examines the role of internal capital markets in influencing the investment allocation process of those conglomerates. My findings suggest that frictions between conglomerate headquarters and external capital markets are at the root of investment inefficiencies generated by internal capital markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007Kristin J. Forbes, Roberto Rigobon Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 5. P. 2223-2261.
This paper examines stock market co-movements. It begins with a discussion of several conceptual issues involved in measuring these movements and how to test for contagion. Standard tests examine if cross-market correlation in stock market returns increase during a period of crisis. The measure of cross-market correlations central to this standard analysis, however, is biased. The unadjusted correlation coefficient is conditional on market movements over the time period under consideration, so that during a period of turmoil when stock market volatility increases, standard estimates of cross-market correlations will be biased upward. It is straightforward to adjust the correlation coefficient to correct for this bias The remainder of the paper applies these concepts to test for stock market contagion during the 1997 East Asian crises, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse, and the 1987 U.S. stock market crash. In each of these cases, tests based on the unadjusted correlation coefficients find evidence of contagion in several countries, while tests based on the adjusted coefficients find virtually no contagion. This suggests that high market co-movements during these periods were a continuation of strong cross-market linkages. In other words, during these three crises there was no contagion, only interdependence