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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

SSRN Working Papers

Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Lawrence D. Brown, Marcus L. Caylor SSRN Working Papers. 2004. 
We create a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on a new dataset provided by Institutional Shareholder Services. Gov-Score is a composite measure of 51 factors encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. We relate Gov-Score to operating performance, valuation, and shareholder payout for 2,327 firms, and we find that better-governed firms are relatively more profitable, more valuable, and pay out more cash to their shareholders. We examine which of the eight categories underlying Gov-Score are most highly associated with firm performance. We show that good governance, as measured using executive and director compensation, is most highly associated with good performance. In contrast, we show that good governance as measured using charter/bylaws is most highly associated with bad performance. We examine which of the 51 factors underlying Gov-Score are most highly associated with firm performance. Some factors representing good governance that are associated with good performance have seldom been examined before (e.g., governance committee meets annually, independence of nominating committee). In contrast, some factors representing good governance that are associated with bad performance have often been examined before (e.g., consulting fees less than audit fees paid to auditors, absence of a staggered board, absence of a poison pill). Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) created G-Index, an oft-used summary measure of corporate governance. G-Index is based on 24 governance factors provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center. These factors are concentrated mostly in one ISS category, charter/bylaws, which we show is less highly associated with good performance than are any of the other seven categories we examine. We document that Gov-Score is better linked to firm performance than is G-Index.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love, Andrei Rachinsky SSRN Working Papers. 2006. 
There is increasing evidence that broad measures of firm-level corporate governance predict higher share prices. However, almost all prior work relies on cross-sectional data. This work leaves open the possibility that endogeneity or omitted firm-level variables explain the observed correlations. We address the second possibility by offering time-series evidence from Russia for 1999-present, exploiting a number of available governance indices. We find an economically important and statistically strong correlation between governance and market value both in OLS and in fixed effects regressions with firm-index fixed effects. We also find large differences in coefficients and significance levels, including some sign reversals, between OLS and fixed effects specifications. This suggests that cross-sectional results may be unreliable. We also find significant differences in the predictive power of different indices, and in the components of these indices. How one measures governance matters.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Hollis Ashbaugh, Daniel W. Collins, Ryan LaFond SSRN Working Papers. 2004. 
Separation of ownership and control in firms creates information asymmetry problems between shareholders and managers that expose shareholders to a variety of agency risks. This paper investigates the extent to which governance attributes that are intended to mitigate agency risk affect firms' cost of equity capital. We examine governance attributes along four dimensions: (1) financial information quality, (2) ownership structure, (3) shareholder rights, and (4) board structure. We find that firms reporting larger abnormal accruals and less transparent earnings have a higher cost of equity, whereas firms with more independent audit committees have a lower cost of equity. We also find that firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by activist institutions receive a lower cost of equity, whereas firms with more blockholders have a higher cost of equity. Moreover, we find a negative relation between the cost of equity and the independence of the board and the percentage of the board that owns stock. Collectively, the governance attributes we examine explain roughly 8% of the cross-sectional variation in firms' cost of capital and 14 % of the variation in firms' beta. The results support the general hypothesis that firms with better governance present less agency risk to shareholders resulting in lower cost of equity capital.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Ricardo P. C. Leal, Andre L. Carvalhal-da-Silva SSRN Working Papers. 2005. 
We construct a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available information. Our goal was to measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest possible number of firms without the biases and low response ratios typical of qualitative surveys. CGI levels have improved over time in Brazil. CGI components demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of corporate governance. We find very high concentration levels of voting rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting shares. Control has concentrated between 1998 and 2002. We do not find evidence for either entrenchment or incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages but find that the separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a .38 increase in Tobin's q. This represents a 95% rise in the stock value of a company with the average leverage and Tobin's q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8% rise in the stock price of the average firm in 2002. We found no significant relationship between governance and the dividend payout but there are indications that dividend payments are greater when control and cash flow rights concentration are greater. We place our results in context by offering a comparative analysis with Chile. We would offer a sound "yes" if asked whether good corporate governance practices increase corporate value in Brazil.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre SSRN Working Papers. 2003. 
This paper studies how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Our study gives rise to the following findings. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre SSRN Working Papers. 2003. 
This paper studies how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Our study gives rise to the following findings. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson SSRN Working Papers. 2005. 
We examine the relation between a broad set of corporate governance indicators and various measures of managerial decision making and organizational performance. Using a sample of 2,106 firms, we distill 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debt-holders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables into 14 governance constructs using principal components analysis. We find that these 14 constructs are related to future operating performance, have a somewhat mixed association with abnormal accruals, Tobin’s Q, and future excess stock returns, and little relation to class action lawsuit and accounting restatements.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Darin G. Clay SSRN Working Papers. 2002. 
Institutional shareholdings have a systematically positive effect on firm value and alter the Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) finding of a nonmonotonic relation between insider ownership and value. The evidence indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in institutional stock ownership translates to a 0.6% increase in the firm's market-to-book ratio, or an increase of $125M for the mean firm in cross-sectional analysis. Controlling for institutional holdings converts the original MSV finding - that firm value first increases with stock ownership by the board, then decreases, and then increases again - to one in which firm value uniformly increases with greater board ownership. These findings support the view that increased incentives for monitoring both by the board and by institutional investors consistently leads to higher company value. The evidence also indicates that the positive relation between institutional holdings and firm value is stronger in firms with higher discretionary cash flows and in the period following the 1992 adoption of proxy rule amendments that increased the bargaining power of institutions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Stefan Voigt, Hella Engerer SSRN Working Papers. 2001. 
Paper presents a short overview of the New Institutional Economics. It is not intended to be a complete survey of the field but an extract that concentrates on the specific arguments made here that are in contrast with the assumptions commonly made in mainstream theory. Since the aim of this paper is to come up with policy implications, specific assumptions will be emphasized only if they might become crucial for policy implications. The results of some empirical studies are presented after having dealt with some of the methodological problems. One of the parts focuses on the NIE in the context of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
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Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Shannon W. Anderson SSRN Working Papers. 2005. 
Strategic cost management is deliberate decision-making aimed at aligning the firm's cost structure with its strategy and optimizing the enactment of the strategy. Alignment and optimization must comprehend the full value chain and all stakeholders to ensure long run sustainable profits for the firm. Strategic cost management takes two forms: structural cost management, which employs tools of organizational design, product design and process design to build a cost structure that is coherent with strategy; and executional cost management, which employs various measurement and analysis tools (e.g., variance analysis, analysis of cost drivers) to evaluate cost performance. In this chapter I develop a model that relates strategic cost management to strategy development and performance evaluation. I argue that although management accounting research has advanced our understanding of executional cost management, other management fields have done more to advance our understanding of structural cost management. I review research in a variety of management fields to illustrate this point. I conclude by proposing that management accounting researchers are uniquely qualified to create a body of strategic cost management knowledge that unifies structural and executional cost management.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Avner Greif SSRN Working Papers. 1996.  No. 9611132.
This paper discusses the three approaches within economic history that utilizes micro-economic theory to examine institutions, their nature, change, and efficiency: the Neo-classical Economics approach, the New Institutional Economic History approach, and Historical Institutional Analysis approach. The focus is on methodology and general results rather than on any specific conclusions regarding institutions in particular historical episodes. Most of the survey is devoted to elaborate on the recent development of Historical Institutional Analysis.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит прикрепленный файл
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Avner Greif SSRN Working Papers. 1997.  No. 9712104.
This paper examines the extent to which common knowledge regarding social structure impact the set of feasible institutions and thereby the scope of inter-community, impersonal market exchange. When this extent is large, economic agents can condition their actions on ones social affiliation thereby enabling the operation of an institution taking advantage of intra-community, personal contract enforcement to support inter-community, impersonal exchange. This argument is embedded in a historical study of contract enforcement institution that supported inter-community, impersonal exchange in pre-modern Europe. The papers game theoretical and historical analysis indicates the importance of a particular institution the Community Responsibility System in supporting inter-community, impersonal exchange from as early as the twelfth century despite the lack of appropriate legal contract enforceability provided by the state. Thus, the analysis suggests the deficiency of the common view in economic history that in pre-modern Europe impersonal exchange were not conducted before the emerging states established the appropriate legal system. By the thirteenth century, however, various communities attempted to abolish the Community Responsibility System and substitute it with legal contract enforcement provided by the state. Social processes that impact the extent to which social structure is common knowledge, communities size, intra-community heterogeneity, and inter community mobility were important contributors to this transition
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Arturo Capasso SSRN Working Papers. 2006. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a few serious financial scandals and many cases of corporate mismanagement have driven scholars and politicians to devote increasing attention to corporate governance, in a close relation with business ethics issues. In academic literature, as well as in public policy debates, corporate governance is nowadays acknowledged as a critical factor in economic development and financial markets stability. The evolution in the nature of the firm is among the major causes for the crisis of established corporate governance models. The traditional manufacturing companies - vertically integrated and capital intensive - which emerged at the beginning of the last century and had since then prevailed - have been challenged by new organizational structures, based on intangible assets and networks, more appropriate to a dynamically changing environment, where competition is driven by the availability of distinctive competencies, based on firm-specific knowledge. This paper, building on the resource based view of the firm, but also on stakeholder approach to strategic management, explores how the growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping, in many industries, the basic conditions of corporate governance. The aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims, as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the corporate governance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 01-11-2007
Cheng Hua SSRN Working Papers. 2006. 
We develop a dynamic model in which traders have differential information about the true value of the risky asset and trade the risky asset with proportional transaction costs. We show that without additional assumption, trading volume can not totally remove the noise in the pricing equation. However, because trading volume increases in the absolute value of noisy per capita supply change, it provides useful information on the asset fundamental value which cannot be inferred from the equilibrium price. We further investigate the relation between trading volume, price autocorrelation, return volatility and proportional transaction costs. Firstly, trading volume decreases in proportional transaction costs and the influence of proportional transaction costs decreases at the margin. Secondly, price autocorrelation can be generated by proportional transaction costs: under no transaction costs, the equilibrium prices at date 1 and 2 are not correlated; however under proportional transaction costs, they are correlated - the higher (lower) the equilibrium price at date 1, the lower (higher) the equilibrium price at date 2. Thirdly, we show that return volatility may be increasing in proportional transaction costs, which is contrary to Stiglitz 1989, Summers & Summers 1989’s reasoning but is consistent with Umlauf 1993 and Jones & Seguin 1997’s empirical results
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