Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-07-2004Gregory N. Mankiw, David Romer, David N. Weil Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1992. Vol. 107. No. 2. P. 407-437.
This paper examines whether the Solow growth model is consistent with the international variation in the standard of living. It shows that an augmented Solow model that includes accumulation of human as well as physical capital provides an excellent description of the cross-country data. The paper also examines the implications of the Solow model for convergence in standards of living, that is, for whether poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. The evidence indicates that, holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge at about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Walter Y. Oi Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1971. Vol. 85. P. 77-96.
Examines the two-part tariffs for the monopoly pricing of amusement park rides at Disneyland in California. Effect of a monopoly on prices; Determination of a nondiscriminatory two-part tariff; Applications of the two-part tariffs. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007Martin J. Osborne, Al Slivinski Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1996. Vol. 111. No. 1. P. 65-96.
The authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values, all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system. The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. No. 2. P. 531-552.
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm's other segments.
Are Output Fluctuations Transitory? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004John Y. Campbell, Gregory N. Mankiw Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1987. Vol. 102. No. 4. P. 857-880.
According to the conventional view of the business cycle, fluctuations in output represent temporary deviations from trend. The purpose of this paper is to question this conventional view. If fluctuations in output are dominated by temporary deviations from the natural rate of output, then an unexpected change in output today should not substantially change one's forecast of output in, say, five or ten years. Our examination of quarterly postwar United States data leads us to be skeptical about this implication. The data suggest that an unexpected change in real GNP of 1 percent should change one's forecast by over 1 percent over a long horizon.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2003William James Adams, Janet L. Yellen Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 90. No. 3. P. 475-498.
Presents information on a study which analyzed the prevalence of commodity bundling as a marketing strategy. Cost savings in production, transactions and information associated with commodity bundling; Characteristics of commodity bundling; Problems associated with convention price discrimination that can overcome by commodity bundling; Conclusions. (Из Ebsco)
Contracting with Externalities [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007Ilya R. Segal Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999. Vol. 114. No. 2. P. 337-388.
The paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. When the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers, the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non-signers. In contrast, when the principal's offers are privately observed, the distortion is due to the externalities given agents' equilibrium trades. Comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes. In both cases, we show that when N is large, each agent can be treated as non-pivotal, provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied. We also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent's trade on other agents' messages. We characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent's participation is voluntary. When the principal can commit to any such mechanism, she implements the first-best outcome, while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment. However, in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than N goes to infinity, in the limit we obtain a (generally inefficient) outcome in which each agent feels non-pivotal.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 1. P. 107-155.
Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 2. P. 453-517 .
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004Allan Drazen, Paul R. Masson Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994. Vol. 09. No. 3. P. 735-754.
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Joshua D. Angrist, Alan B. Krueger Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1991. Vol. 106. No. 4. P. 979-1014.
The authors establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws. Individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age, and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year. Roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws. They estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education. The instrumental valuables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate, suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007A. Colin Cameron, Severin Borenstein, Richard J. Gilbert Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997. Vol. 112. No. 1. P. 305-39.
The authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices. Among the possible sources of this asymmetry are production/inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers. By analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain, the authors attempt to shed light on these theories. Spot prices for generic gasoline show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes, which may reflect inventory adjustment effects. Asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes, possibly indicating short-run market power among retailers.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Frederic T. Moore Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1959. Vol. 73. No. 2. P. 232-45.
Содержание: I. Statement of the problem, 232.--II. The evidence from some previous studies, 233.--III. The ".6 factor" rule and its application, 234.--IV. Specific evidence in a selection of metal processing and chemical industries, 236.--V. Studies of selected mineral industries, 239.--VI. Conclusions, 242 (Из JStore)
Educational Production [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003Edward Lazear Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 116. No. 3. P. 777-803.
Classroom education has public good aspects. The technology is such that when one student disrupts the class, learning is reduced for all other students. A disruption model of educational production is presented. It is shown that optimal class size is larger for better-behaved students, which helps explain why it is difficult to find class size effects in the data. Additionally, the role of discipline is analyzed and applied to differences in performance of Catholic and public schools. An empirical framework is discussed where the importance of sorting students, teacher quality, and other factors can be assessed.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Arthur Smithies Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1940. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 95115.
The meaning of an imperfect market, 95.--Assumptions underlying the present analysis, 96.--I. The demand functions, 96.--II. Competitor's expectation of his rivals' behavior, 98.--His estimated demand function, 100.--III. Diagrammatic demonstration of attainment of equilibrium, 100.--IV. Equilibrium conditions for the general case, 103.--Conditions affecting the relative magnitudes of p1 and p2 equilibrium: (1) differences in demand functions, 105; different methods of estimation, 106; (3) cost differences, 106.--V. Conditions under which equilibrium is stable and economically possible, 107.--Cases where the stability conditions are not fulfilled or where equilibrium is economically impossible, 114. (Из JStore)