Games and Economic Behavior
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004
David Myatt, Chris C. Wallace
Games and Economic Behavior.
2004.
Vol. 48.
No. 1.
P. 124-138.
Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour
in which agents choose best responses to observations of population play. Crucially,
infrequent mistakes (`mutations`) allow agents to take actions contrary to current
trends and prevent initial configurations from determining long run play. An alternative
approach is offered here: Harsanyian trembles are added to agents` payoffs so that
with some probability it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run
distribution of population behaviour is characterised - modes correspond to stable
Bayesian Nash equilibria. Allowing the variance of payoff trembles to vanish, via
a purification process, a single equilibrium is played almost always in the long
run. Kandori et al and Young show that the number of contrarian actions required
to escape an equilibrium determines selection; here, the likelihood that such actions
are taken is of equal importance.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Debraj Ray, Rakesh V. Vohra
Games and Economic Behavior.
1999.
Vol. 26.
No. 2.
P. 286-336.
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements
can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds
by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish
the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main
results are concerned with the characterization of equilibrium coalition structures.
We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium
coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric
partition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our
results to a Cournot oligopoly.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2005
Reinhard Selten, Myrna Wooders
Games and Economic Behavior.
2001.
Vol. 34.
No. 1.
P. 138-152.
We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005
Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Joachim Buchta, Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Games and Economic Behavior.
2003.
Vol. 45.
No. 1.
P. 19-37.
Using the strategy method (Selten 1967) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing
any 2-person 3x3-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. In each of 5 tournaments,
every strategy pair plays 500000 games. The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium
play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, with the equilibria
that maximize joint payoff being preferred when multiple exist. For games without
pure equilibria, strategies are typically based on elements of the best-reply cascade:
MAP (maximize the expected payoff against uniformly randomizing opponents), BR-MAP
(best reply to MAP), and BR-BR-MAP (best reply to BR-MAP).
Опубликовано на портале: 08-07-2005
Kenneth Joseph Arrow
Games and Economic Behavior.
2003.
Vol. 45.
No. 1.
P. 15-18.
I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application
in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions
have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments.
Learning to Play Bayesian Games [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David Knudsen Levine
Games and Economic Behavior.
2004.
Vol. 46.
No. 2.
P. 282-303.
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of games
with a move by Nature. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling
situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as
well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that
quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium
without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.
Sequentially Optimal Auctions [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Daniel R. Vincent, R. Preston McAfee
Games and Economic Behavior.
1997.
Vol. 18.
No. 2.
We examine equlibria in sequential auctions where a seller can post a reserve price
but, if the auction fails to result in a sale, can commit keeping the object off
the market only for an exogenously fixed period of time. We restrict attention to
enviornments where bidders have independent private values and where the support
of the bidder types lies strictly above the valuation of the seller. In the case
where the seller sells by second price auction in each period, there is a unique
perfect Bayesian equilbrium. A form of revenue equivalence is shown. There exists
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of repeated first price auctions with the feature
that in every period, the seller's expected revenue from the continuation is the
same in either auction mechanism. As the length of time the seller can commit to
keeping the object off the market goes to zero, seller expected revenues converge
to those of a static auction with no reserve price. As the number of bidders becomes
large, the seller expected revenue approaches the revenue from an optimal static
auction. We also characterize a parametrized auction game in which the simple equilibrium
reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy commonly used by many auctioneers.
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