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Games and Economic Behavior

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Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2005
Reinhard Selten, Myrna Wooders Games and Economic Behavior. 2001.  Vol. 34. No. 1. P. 138-152. 
We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.
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