RAND Journal of Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Robert H. Porter RAND Journal of Economics. 1983. Vol. 14. No. 2. P. 301-314.
This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior. An equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model. The hypothesis that no switch took place, so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007David M.G. Newbery RAND Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 29. No. 4. P. 726-749.
The supply function model of the English electricity spot market is extended to include a contract market and contestable entry, both of which have dramatic effects on the determination of equilibrium. I present an analytically tractable model that can be solved with contracts, variable numbers of competitors, and capacity constraints. In the case of constant marginal costs and linear demand, two outcomes are possible: if new plant is the same as existing plant and incumbents have insufficient capacity, entry will occur, but if new plant has lower variable costs then incumbents can invest to deter entry.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Richard Charles Levin, Peter C. Reiss RAND Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 19. No. 4. P. 538-556.
This article analyzes R&D policies when the returns to cost-reducing and demand-creating R&D are imperfectly appropriable and market structure is endogenous. We generalize previous characterizations of appropriability to permit the possibility that own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes. We also describe how equilibrium expenditures on process and product R&D, as well as equilibrium market structure, depend on technological opportunities and spillovers. In contrast to previous work, diminished appropriability does not necessarily reduce R&D expenditures. For example, under some conditions, an increase in the extent of process (product) spillovers will lead to an increase in product (process) R&D. We estimate several variants of the model by using manufacturing line-of-business data and data from a survey of R&D executives.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Steven T. Berry RAND Journal of Economics. 1994. Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 242-262.
This article considers the problem of "supply-and-demand" analysis on a cross section of oligopoly markets with differentiated products. The primary methodology is to assume that demand can be described by a discrete-choice model and that prices are endogenously determined by price-setting firms. In contrast to some previous empirical work, the techniques explicitly allow for the possibility that prices are correlated with unobserved demand factors in the cross section of markets. The article proposes estimation by "inverting" the market-share equation to find the implied mean levels of utility for each good. This method allows for estimation by traditional instrumental variables techniques.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Steven Klepper RAND Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 37-61.
After their commercial introduction, the number of producers of autos, tires, televisions, and penicillin initially grew and then experienced a sharp decline or shakeout. Guided by an evolutionary model of entry and exit, firm survival patterns in the four products are examined to determine whether there were common forces governing their distinctive evolution. Predictions concerning the effects of pre- and post-entry experience and the timing of entry on firm survival are tested. The findings are used to reflect on why industries experience shakeouts and evolve to be oligopolies.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Joel Waldfogel, Steven T. Berry RAND Journal of Economics. 1999. Vol. 30. No. 3. P. 397-420.
In theory, free entry can lead to social inefficiency. We study the radio industry in a first attempt to quantify this inefficiency. Using cross-sectional data on advertising prices, the number of stations, and radio listening, we estimate the parameters of listeners' decisions and of firms' profits. Relative to the social optimum, our estimates imply that the welfare loss (to firms and advertisers) of free entry is 45% of revenue. However, the free entry equilibrium would be optimal if the marginal value of programming to listeners were about three times the value of marginal listeners to advertisers.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2008Jonathan David Levin RAND Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 32. No. 4. P. 657-666.
This paper revisits Akerlofs (1970) classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the buyers curse, thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characteization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyers information i.e. making private information public unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003Karl Warneryd, Holger M. Mueller RAND Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 32. No. 3. P. 527-541.
Если внутрифирменные контракты неполны, то менеджеры будут тратить ресурсы на попытку присвоить часть созданного излишка себе. В статье показано, что внешние собственники могут снизить потери мертвого груза, ассоциирующееся с перераспределительным конфликтом, даже если возникает конфликт на новом уровне (менеджер-собственник). В случае, если менеджера стимулируют осуществлять специфические инвестиции, возникает дилемма между минимизацией издержек рентоориентированного поведения и максимизацией выручки. На этой основе авторы выдвинули объяснение, почему некоторые фирмы организованы как партнерства, а другие как корпорации.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Aviv Nevo RAND Journal of Economics. 2000. Vol. 31. No. 3. P. 395-421.
Traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products. I discuss an alternative, which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger. I estimate a brand-level demand system for ready-to-eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to (1) recover marginal costs, (2) simulate postmerger price equilibria, and (3) compute welfare effects, under a variety of assumptions. The methodology is applied to five mergers, two of which occurred and for which I compare predicted to actual outcomes.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Kyle Bagwell, Susan Carleton Athey RAND Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 32. No. 3. P. 428-465.
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency, and high-cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods. If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above which first-best profits can be attained using history-dependent reallocation of market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication and side-payments.
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro RAND Journal of Economics. 1990. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 106-112.
In providing rewards to innovators, there is a tradeoff between patent length and breadth. This article provides conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward for innovation.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-12-2003Richard J. Gilbert, David M.G. Newbery RAND Journal of Economics. 1994. Vol. 25. No. 4. P. 538-554.
In this article, we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment. Rate-of-return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate-of-return regulation without such a commitment. Furthermore, rate-of-return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion, assuming that the regulator is unable to make state-contingent transfer payments.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Martin K. Perry, Robert H. Groff RAND Journal of Economics. 1986. Vol. 17. No. 2. P. 189-200.
Examines the efficacy of intrabrand rivalry in a monopolistically competitive industry in the United States. Reduction of price and product diversity; Domination of welfare losses on product diversity than welfare gains from lower prices; Decline of consumer surplus. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Patrick L. Bajari, Ali Hortaçsu RAND Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 34. No. 2. P. 329-55.
Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on eBay. Using our parameter estimates from this model, we measure the extent of the winner's curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices.