Bell Journal of Economics
Advertising and welfare. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Avinash K. Dixit, Victor Norman Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 1-17.
This paper applies conventional welfare-theoretic methods to study advertising which changes consumer tastes. In a wide range of empirically plausible circumstances, private profitability is seen to be necessary but not sufficient for the social desirability of a small amount of advertising. The market equilibrium level of such advertising is shown to be socially excessive, even when postadvertising tastes are used as the standard for welfare judgments and the monopoly profits resulting from the advertising are included in welfare. Settings of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition are examined, and the contention that advertising is excessive is found to be strengthened at each stage. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003David D. Friedman Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 10. No. 2. P. 706-708.
Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to longhaul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Hayne E. Leland, Robert A. Meyer Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 449-62.
While some firms, such as airlines, may have both the informational and legal capabilities for identifying and segmenting customers into different markets, most firms do not. When only the distribution of characteristics of consumers is known, we characterize the situation as one of imperfect discrimination. Individuals in such markets cannot be identified; thus, all must face the same price structure. Some discrimination is nonetheless possible through the use of nonuniform pricing policies. For optimal nonuniform pricing schedules, we have focused attention on two: profit maximization and welfare maximization, and consider two common forms of nonuniform pricing: two-part and two-block policies. We show that, regardless of the firm's objective, it can always do at least as well with a two-block as with a two-part policy (and at least as well with a two-part policy as with uniform pricing). The two-part and block pricing schemes strictly dominate the uniform scheme for a profit maximizer, and increased profit is not always at the expense of welfare. Under uncertainty we observe it is also possible to obtain an ordering over the uniform, two-part and block pricing strategies on risk-efficiency grounds. Without assuming any specific probability distributions or assuming any specific way in which the random component affects demand, we demonstrate that an expected utility of profit maximizer will find a block pricing policy at least as preferred as a two-part pricing policy, which in turn is strictly preferred to a uniform policy. Our results indicate that optimal regulation of utilities should not rule out block rate structures a priori. Declining block prices are not necessarily antithetical to welfare maximization in a profit-constrained environment. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Roger W. Koenker, Martin K. Perry Bell Journal of Economics. 1981. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 217-232.
This paper generalizes a model of monopolistic competition attributable to Spence (1976). Firms produce symmetrically differentiated products with declining or U-shaped average costs. Free entry drives profits to zero in equilibrium. Spence finds that when firms behave "competitively," in a specific sense, the market equilibrium yields too little product diversity. However, when Spence' s "competitive" behavioral assumption is relaxed, we find that the market may produce excessive diversity; this occurs when product differentiation is weak relative to scale economies of production. We also study two second-best regulatory policies and characterize conditions under which they are potentially effective in improving the market outcome. [Авторский текст]
Spatial price policies revisited [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Martin J. Beckmann Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 619-630.
This paper reexamines the theory of spatial price policies under more general conditions to compare mill pricing, uniform delivered pricing, and discriminatory local pricing and to interpret their implications when market regions are given. The analysis assumes that demand functions are linear and identical in all locations, that marginal production cost is constant, and that transportation cost is proportional to distance. The results go beyond previous findings, but do not seriously contradict them. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Ariel Rubinstein Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 407-25.
A simple formula is developed for the valuation of uncertain income streams consistent with rational risk averse investor behavior and equilibrium in financial markets. Applying this formula to the pricing of an option as a function of its associated stock, the Black-Scholes formula is derived even though investors can only trade at discrete points in time. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Stephen C. Littlechild Bell Journal of Economics. 1975. Vol. 6. P. 661-670.
This paper provides explicit characterizations of those two-part tariffs which maximize profit and consumers' plus producer's surplus. The effect of consumption externalities (as in telecommunications systems) is then explored. The characterizations are in terms of elasticities of demand with respect to price, income, and the number of other customers in the system. [Авторский текст]