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Journal of Economic Theory

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Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Roger B. Myerson, Mark A. Satterthwaite Journal of Economic Theory. 1981.  Vol. 29. No. 2.
We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit.
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