University of Missouri-Columbia, Paper Draft
Выпуски:
A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law,
and the Theory of the Firm [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003
Harvey S. James
University of Missouri-Columbia, Paper Draft.
2001.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the common law governing the employment
of labor
makes the distinction not only between employee and independent contractor but also
between
managerial control and agency. The idea is that common law precedents govern workers
who are
employed and managerially controlled without the requirement that formal, written
contracts be
established, and that these defaults support the authority of management to direct
their activities within
the firm. However, many firm owners voluntarily restrict their ability to control
workers by making them
agents. Workers who are agents differ from workers who are managerially controlled
in that in the former
caseworkers are treated differently in the eyes of the common law and they often
sign detailed, formal
employment contracts. The typical features of formal employment contracts are examined.
The principal
conclusion is that formal employment contracts facilitate the granting of discretion
to workers by
superseding many of the legal defaults that define the relationship between the worker
and firm owner.


