The Economic Journal
Опубликовано на портале: 20-07-2004James Banks, Paul Johnson The Economic Journal. 1994. Vol. 104. No. 425. P. 883-890.
Recent studies have assessed the impact of choice of equivalence scale on economists' measurement of the equivalent income distribution. One particular study (Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992)) has found that equivalence scales used in the UK official statistics `provide lower estimates of the extent of inequality and poverty than do other scales'. In this paper we demonstrate that these kind of results are dependent on the particular year of data and equivalence scale specification that is used and are not properties intrinsic to particular methodologies. Results are also not robust to the use of more recent UK microeconomic data.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-09-2003Amparo Castelly, Rafael Domenech The Economic Journal. 2002. Vol. 112. No. 478. P. 187-200.
This paper provides new measures of human capital inequality for a broad panel of countries. Taking attainment levels from Barro and Lee (2001), we compute Gini coefficients and the distribution of education by quintiles for 108 countries over five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000. Using this new cross-country data on human capital inequality two main conclusions are obtained. First, most countries in the world have tended to reduce the inequality in human capital distribution. Second, human capital inequality measures provide more robust results than income inequality measures in the estimation of standard growth and investment equations.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007Simon Wren-Lewis, Campbell Leith The Economic Journal. 2000. Vol. 110. No. 462, Conference Papers. P. C93-C108.
The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not, by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively 'passive'. However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek, on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact
Опубликовано на портале: 20-07-2004Stephen P. Jenkins, Frank A. Cowell The Economic Journal. 1994. Vol. 104. No. 425. P. 891-900.
We respond to Banks and Johnson's (1994) Comment on Coulter et al. (1992) drawing on a more general discussion of parametric equivalence scale and scale relativity issues and new empirical results. We show that criticisms of our earlier work are unfounded. When the McClements scale is properly characterised, the scale does indeed provide lower estimates of poverty and inequality levels than most other scales. We reiterate our conclusion that relationships between scale relativities and inequality and poverty indices may be index-specific. Moreover the picture about distributional trends may differ from that about levels.
Social norms and moral hazard [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Martin Dufwenbergy, Michael Lundholmz The Economic Journal. 2001. No. 111. P. 506-526.
В статье рассматривается функционирование системы социального страхования в условиях, когда индивиды стремятся использовать частную информацию для увеличения своей выгоды в ущерб другим. Авторы приходят к выводу, что социальные нормы могут способствовать ослаблению проблемы морального риска. Тем не менее, распределение социального статуса в обществе не будет равномерным.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Jorge A. Padilla The Economic Journal. 2002. Vol. 112. No. 479. P. 317-343.
In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider--outsider theory that acknowledges that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to increase the efficiency of hiring decisions although union contracts will look like inducing underemployment.