The Economic Journal
Опубликовано на портале: 20-07-2004
James Banks, Paul Johnson
The Economic Journal.
1994.
Vol. 104.
No. 425.
P. 883-890.
Recent studies have assessed the impact of choice of equivalence scale on economists'
measurement of the equivalent income distribution. One particular study (Coulter,
Cowell and Jenkins (1992)) has found that equivalence scales used in the UK official
statistics `provide lower estimates of the extent of inequality and poverty than
do other scales'. In this paper we demonstrate that these kind of results are dependent
on the particular year of data and equivalence scale specification that is used and
are not properties intrinsic to particular methodologies. Results are also not robust
to the use of more recent UK microeconomic data.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-09-2003
Amparo Castelly, Rafael Domenech
The Economic Journal.
2002.
Vol. 112.
No. 478.
P. 187-200.
This paper provides new measures of human capital inequality for a broad panel of
countries. Taking attainment levels from Barro and Lee (2001), we compute Gini coefficients
and the distribution of education by quintiles for 108 countries over five-year intervals
from 1960 to 2000. Using this new cross-country data on human capital inequality
two main conclusions are obtained. First, most countries in the world have tended
to reduce the inequality in human capital distribution. Second, human capital inequality
measures provide more robust results than income inequality measures in the estimation
of standard growth and investment equations.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007
Simon Wren-Lewis, Campbell Leith
The Economic Journal.
2000.
Vol. 110.
No. 462, Conference Papers.
P. C93-C108.
The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate
inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary
policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising
fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not,
by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively 'passive'.
However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek,
on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the
fiscal stability pact
Опубликовано на портале: 20-07-2004
Stephen P. Jenkins, Frank A. Cowell
The Economic Journal.
1994.
Vol. 104.
No. 425.
P. 891-900.
We respond to Banks and Johnson's (1994) Comment on Coulter et al. (1992) drawing
on a more general discussion of parametric equivalence scale and scale relativity
issues and new empirical results. We show that criticisms of our earlier work are
unfounded. When the McClements scale is properly characterised, the scale does indeed
provide lower estimates of poverty and inequality levels than most other scales.
We reiterate our conclusion that relationships between scale relativities and inequality
and poverty indices may be index-specific. Moreover the picture about distributional
trends may differ from that about levels.
Social norms and moral hazard [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Martin Dufwenbergy, Michael Lundholmz
The Economic Journal.
2001.
No. 111.
P. 506-526.
В статье рассматривается функционирование системы социального страхования в условиях,
когда индивиды стремятся использовать частную информацию для увеличения своей выгоды
в ущерб другим. Авторы приходят к выводу, что социальные нормы могут способствовать
ослаблению проблемы морального риска. Тем не менее, распределение социального статуса
в обществе не будет равномерным.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004
Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Jorge A. Padilla
The Economic Journal.
2002.
Vol. 112.
No. 479.
P. 317-343.
In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider--outsider theory that acknowledges
that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining
decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination
of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed
to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that
there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to increase the efficiency
of hiring decisions although union contracts will look like inducing underemployment.
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