European Economic Review
European Inflation Dynamics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-10-2007Jordi Gali, Mark Gertler, J. David Lopez-Salido European Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 45. No. 7. P. 1237-1270.
We provide evidence on the fit of the New Phillips Curve (NPC) for the Euro area over the period 1970-1998, and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of European inflation dynamics with those observed in the U.S. We also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs, as well as that of its two main components, namely, labor productivity and real wages. Some of the findings can be summarized as follows: (a) the NPC fits Euro area data very well, possibly better than U.S. data, (b) the degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates is substantial, but in line with survey evidence and U.S. estimates, (c) inflation dynamics in the Euro area appear to have a stronger forward-looking component (i.e., less inertia) than in the U.S., (d) labor market frictions, as manifested in the behavior of the wage markup, appear to have played a key role in shaping the behavior of marginal costs and, consequently, inflation in Europe.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2007Avinash K. Dixit European Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 45. No. 4-6. P. 589-613.
This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries' most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Avinash K. Dixit, Luisa Lambertini European Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 45. No. 4-6. P. 977-987.
We consider monetary-fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. If monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets, the Nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities. Leadership of either authority is better. Fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment: The optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy. Agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary-fiscal symbiosis, yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives, for any order of moves, without fiscal coordination, and without monetary commitment.