Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Ralph Chami, Sunil Sharma, Ilhyock Shim Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 2007-26.
The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMFґs objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritanґs dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Learґs dilemma.
A Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 26-11-2007Philip E. Graves Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 2007-12.
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary rules are seen as necessary to constrain politicians’ tax and spending behavior. Popular among such constraints are various Balanced Budget Amendment proposals. These approaches, however, are shown here to have serious limitations, including failure to address the central concern of spending level. An alternative approach is advanced here that relies on a Coase-like mechanism that transfers control of government spending to the voter. Prisoner's dilemma incentives and political competition are seen to be critical to the superiority of the present mechanism to approaches requiring budget balance.
Опубликовано на портале: 26-11-2007Annamaria Fiore, Andrea Morone Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 2007-21.
Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ‘destroy’ information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been studied, this particular aspect has never been extensively analysed. In this article we try to fill this gap, investigating both theoretically and experimentally whether and to which extent destroying information can improve welfare. Our empirical results show that this decisional mechanism actually leads to a behaviour more consistent with the theory that in turn produces the predicted efficiency gain.