Journal of Public Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 18-08-2004
Patrick K. Asea, Stephen J. Turnovsky
Journal of Public Economics.
1998.
Vol. 68.
No. 1.
P. 55-90.
How do capital income taxes affect household portfolio choice and growth? We approach this question within the context of a stochastic model of a small open economy in" which taxes on income from domestic capital (equity) and foreign bonds affect household" portfolio choice, welfare and the growth rate of the economy. The theoretical and numerical" analysis demonstrates the important role that risk plays in determining the mean and variability" of growth as well as the conditions under which a higher tax rate can be welfare improving. To" shed more light on the complex theoretical interaction between taxes and risk-taking we estimate" a reduced-form multinomial probit model of household portfolio choice using the method of" simulated moments. The empirical evidence is in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom " we find that higher taxes make it less likely that the household will hold risky assets."


Опубликовано на портале: 14-11-2003
Marc Fleurbaey, Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Denis Maguain
Journal of Public Economics.
2002.
Vol. 84.
No. 1.
P. 113-150.
Abstract
Autors consider a model of education planning in an economy in which agents differ in
their costs of acquiring education. The agents' cost parameter, called `talent',
is not observed. The principal is endowed with a fixed sum of money, with which two
types of transfer can be made: in cash and in kind. The principal can finance transfers
in kind, called `help', by means of schooling expenditures, which reduce the agent's
education cost. The principal seeks to maximize a social welfare function which is
a CES index of utility levels. Autors study the optimal allocation of individual education
effort, schooling expenditures (help), and cash, under self-selection and budget
constraints. Assuming first that the set of types is finite, and that help and effort
are sufficiently substitutable, we find that individual education investment levels
are an increasing function, and help is a decreasing function of talent. Utility
levels cannot be equalized because of self-selection constraints. More aversion for
inequality unequivocally leads to more inequality of educational achievements, and
to more assistance through redistribution. This remains true in the limit, under
strictly egalitarian preferences of the principal. The same qualitative properties
hold in the general case of a continuum of types. Bunching at the lower end of the
talent scale is a feature of the solution for sufficiently high degrees of inequality
aversion.

Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005
Andrea Prat, Georg Kirchsteiger
Journal of Public Economics.
2001.
Vol. 82.
No. 3.
P. 349-375.
Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically
have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified
by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):131]. In this
paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each
principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative. We run an experiment
on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium
alternative. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65%
of the matches, while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in
less than 5% of the matches (Journal of Public Economics).


Nonlinear prices and welfare [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
Michael Spence
Journal of Public Economics.
1977.
Vol. 8.
No. 1.
P. 8-18.
Focuses on the comparison of price and quantity rationing in terms of their capacities
to allocate scarce goods. Effect of the price system on income redistribution; Correlation
of quantity rationing with nonlinear price schedule; Factors attributing the quantity
of rationing. (Из Ebsco)

Optimal price discrimination [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
John M. Hartwick
Journal of Public Economics.
1978.
Vol. 9.
No. 1.
P. 83-89.
Focuses on practice of price discrimination among public utilities. Variations of
charges with the user; Approach to maximize profits; Strategies for transferring
consumer surplus to the revenues of producers.(Из Ebsco)

Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005
David M.G. Newbery
Journal of Public Economics.
1997.
Vol. 63.
No. 2.
P. 177-206.
Budgets in Eastern Europe are under strain as taxes are reformed and receipts fall.
Should expenditure be maintained or should personal taxes be cut? This paper asks
how optimal tax rates might respond to a transition in which the government becomes
less averse to inequality, but the inequality in skills increases. These are roughly
offsetting and less important than falling enterprise revenue and the decline in
the efficiency of personal taxation, both of which cause a sharp fall in optimal
transfers. Tax design consists of balancing the differing inefficiencies of incompleteness
in indirect tax coverage against evasion-prone direct taxes.


Preference revelation and monopsony [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
G. Fane, E. Sieper
Journal of Public Economics.
1983.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 357-372 .
Presents the formal equivalence between the free-rider problem and monopsony. Elimination
on the inefficiencies of monopsony; Mechanisms used in the problem of free-rider;
Determination on the consumer with willingness-to-pay for public good. (Из Ebsco)


Опубликовано на портале: 18-08-2004
Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett, Robert Glenn Hubbard
Journal of Public Economics.
1996.
Vol. 62.
No. 1-2.
P. 237-273.
We use firm-level panel data to explore the extent to which fixed investment responds
to tax reforms in 14 OECD countries. Previous studies have often found that investment
does not respond to changes in the marginal cost of investment. We identify some
of the factors responsible for this finding and employ an estimation procedure that
sidesteps the most important of them. In so doing, we find evidence of statistically
and economically significant investment responses to tax changes in 12 of the 14
countries.


Two-part tariffs, marginal cost pricing and increasing returns in a general equilibrium.
model. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-03-2003
Donald J. Brown, Geoffrey M. Heal
Journal of Public Economics.
1980.
Vol. 13.
No. 1.
P. 25-49.
Examines the merits of a system of two-part tariffs in the context of a general equilibrium
framework capable of analyzing equilibria in the presence of nonconvexities. Negative
implications for the attractions of a system of marginal cost pricing and multipart
tariffs; Conditions under which marginal cost pricing with two-part tariffs may support
a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. (From Ebsco)

Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2003
Geoffrey Brennan, James M. Buchanan
Journal of Public Economics.
1977.
Vol. 8.
No. 3.
P. 255-273.
В данной статье делается попытка вывести нормативные правила налогообложения, основанные
на конституционных расчетах типичного избирателя-налогоплательщика, прогнозирующего,
что в постконституционных политических процессах будет преобладать максимизирующая
бюджет левиафаноподобная бюрократия. В этой среде селекция налоговых институтов становится
частью аппарата, с помощью которого ограничивается власть Левиафана. Подобный подход
к проблеме служит причиной возникновения правил налогообложения, серьезно противоречащих
более традиционным нормам. В частности, задача создания «всеобъемлющей»
базы налогообложения, характерная для стандартного анализа, уступает предпочтению
конкретных ограничений ширины налоговой базы, поскольку меры, направленные на расширение
базы, неизбежно приведут к росту общественных расходов и за некоторым рубежом станут
явно нежелательными. Данный анализ также подразумевает довольно необычную защиту
прогрессии в структуре налогообложения. Сделана попытка соотнести это обсуждение
с современными проблемами реформы налогообложения.


Стимулы к предоставлению общественных благ местными властями: бюджетный федерализм
по-русски [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-05-2004
Екатерина Журавская
Journal of Public Economics.
2000.
No. 76.
P. 337-368.
На основе уникальных данных по бюджетам российских городов, автор показывает, что
разделение налоговых сборов между региональными и местными органами власти приводит
к отсутствию у местных органов власти стимулов к увеличению налоговой базы или предоставлению
общественных благ. Любые изменения собственных доходов местных органов власти практически
полностью компенсируются изменениями в распределении налоговых сборов, что приводит
к избыточному регулированию частного бизнеса. В работе также показано, что фискальные
стимулы являются определяющими в формировании частного сектора и эффективности предоставления
общественных благ. Российская модель федерализма сравнивается с китайской, где во
многих провинциях фискальные стимулы значительно сильнее.

