Journal of Public Economics
Выпуск N3 за 2001 год
Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005Andrea Prat, Georg Kirchsteiger Journal of Public Economics. 2001. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 349-375.
Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):131]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative. We run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65% of the matches, while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5% of the matches (Journal of Public Economics).