Journal of Macroeconomics
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007
V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli, Carmine Trecroci
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2004.
Vol. 26.
No. 2.
P. 257-280.
This paper examines the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies using an estimated
New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier
work using VAR models, we show that the strategic complementarity or substitutability
of fiscal and monetary policy depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the
economy, and on the assumptions made about the underlying structural model. We also
demonstrate that countercyclical fiscal policy can be welfare-reducing if fiscal
and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
Torben Andersen
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2005.
Vol. 27.
No. 1.
P. 1-29.
Policy mix problems may arise in a currency union like the EMU since monetary policy
(targeting inflation) is centralized and fiscal policy (targeting output) is decentralized.
This issue is considered in a setting allowing for various cross-country interdependencies
and types of shocks (demand/supply; aggregate/idiosyncratic). An inappropriate stabilization
of shocks arises, and fiscal policy is too counter-cyclical when shocks are aggregate,
but insufficiently counter-cyclical for idiosyncratic shocks. The stabilization bias
is increasing in the number of fiscal decision makers when shocks are aggregate,
but decreasing for idiosyncratic shocks. Numerical illustrations show that the cost
of non-cooperative fiscal policies is higher for aggregate than for idiosyncratic
shocks.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2007
Kirdan Lees
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2007.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 959-975.
This paper measures the benefits of commitment-based monetary policy over discretion
for a small open economy inflation targeting country—New Zealand. Significant
gains accrue from commitment policy. If commitment-based policy is unavailable, the
government can recoup much of the gains to commitment through optimal delegation,
asking the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to care more about inflation stabilisation.
The 1999 PTA, the core of the policy contract between the New Zealand government
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, placed an increased emphasis on stabilisation
of output, interest rates and the exchange rate. This is inconsistent with a shift
to optimal delegation behaviour and must stem from a changed perception of the welfare
costs of macroeconomic stabilization on the part of the Government. This is shown
to be true when the definition of inflation is extended to a medium term measure.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2007
Jagjit S. Chadha, Charles Nolan
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2007.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 665-689 .
Stabilization policy involves joint monetary and fiscal rules. We develop a model
enabling us to characterize systematic simple monetary and fiscal policy over the
business cycle. We principally focus on the following question. What are the key
properties of the joint simple rule governing the conduct of systematic stabilization
policy? We find that conducting stabilization policy incorporates not only a set
of monetary policy choices governed by the so-called ‘Taylor principle’
but also fiscal policy that gives considerable force to automatic stabilizers. Recent
US and UK monetary and fiscal choices seem broadly consistent with this model. This
result is found to be robust to a number of alternate modeling strategies
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2007
Timo Wollmershäuser
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2006.
Vol. 28.
No. 3.
P. 493-519.
This paper evaluates the performance of simple policy rules in an open economy. By
introducing a high degree of exchange rate uncertainty we find that policy rules
with an important feedback from movements in the real exchange rate are very robust
to uncertainty about the true exchange rate model. A closed economy rule performs
badly in most exchange rate specifications. This is in contrast to the findings of
many other studies. In our view, this result is due to the fact that these studies
assume a known and reliable relationship between the exchange rate and the interest
rate.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2007
Marianne Nessén
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2002.
Vol. 24.
No. 3.
P. 313-329.
An inflation targeting central bank aims to stabilize the rate of inflation. But
which ‘inflation’ should this be? Quarterly, annual, biennial? We analyze
the effects on optimal monetary policy of increasing the period over which the inflation
rate is defined. When inflation stabilization is the sole objective of the central
bank, more aggressive monetary policy results; but when output stabilization is also
a concern the result is a more cautious conduct of monetary policy and less variability
in output. Thus, there is an observational equivalence between increasing the period
over which inflation is measured and increasing the weight on output stabilization
in the central bank’s objective function. The analogy between inflation targeting
with an infinite-period target and price level targeting is also examined.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-04-2004
James B. Ramsey, Albert Alexander
Journal of Macroeconomics.
1970.
Vol. 6.
No. 3.
P. 347-356.
An econometric analysis is undertaken of the model developed by Blatt (1978). An
important point made by Blatt was that the standard statistical methods used by economists
would have led to egregious errors in inference - in particular, estimating a stable
linear relationship in a world generated by an unstable nonlinear model. It is shown
that the application of specification error tests pioneered by Ramsey (1970, 1974,
1976) leads to immediate and overwhelming rejection of the incorrect model. The major
policy conclusion is that empirical economists must learn to test their models before
trying to make inferences. Although specification error tests do not solve all inferential
difficulties, they do indicate that such a model may be misspecified.
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