Journal of Political Economy
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 94. No. 3. P. 461-488.
In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?
Опубликовано на портале: 18-08-2004Sergio Rebelo Journal of Political Economy. 1991. Vol. 99. No. 3. P. 500-521.
The wide cross-country disparity in rates of economic growth is the most puzzling feature of the development process. This paper describes a class of models in which this heterogeneity in growth experiences can be the result of cross-country differences in government policy. These differences can also create incentives for labor migration from slow-growing to fast-growing countries. In the models considered, growth is endogeneous despite the absence of increasing returns because there is a "core" of capital goods that can be produced without the direct or indirect contribution of factors that cannot be accumulated, such as land.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004Jack Hirshleifer Journal of Political Economy. 1958. Vol. 66. No. 4. P. 329-352.
This article is an attempt to solve (in the theoretical sense), through the use of isoquant analysis, the problem of optimal investment decisions (in business parlance, the problem of capital budgeting). The initial section reviews the principles laid down in Irving Fisher's justly famous works on interest to see what light they shed on two competing rules of behavior currently proposed by economists to guide business investment decisions - the present-value rule and the internal-rate-of return rule. The next concern of the paper is to show how Fisher's principles must be adapted when the perfect capital market assumed in his analysis does not exist - in particular, when borrowing and lending rates diverge, when capital can secured only at an increasing marginal borrowing rate, and when capital is "rationed". Section III, which presents the solution for multiperiod investments, corrects an error by Fisher which has been the source of much difficulty.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Paul Anthony Samuelson Journal of Political Economy. 1979. Vol. 87. No. 5. P. 923-939.
Focuses on the measurement of production functions and marginal productivities by the political economist, Paul Douglas. Presentation of the econometric measurements on the supply of factors of production; Illustration of econometric techniques; Successors of the works of Douglas. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Paul Anthony Samuelson Journal of Political Economy. 1979. Vol. 87. No. 5. P. 923-39.
Focuses on the measurement of production functions and marginal productivities by the political economist, Paul Douglas. Presentation of the econometric measurements on the supply of factors of production; Illustration of econometric techniques; Successors of the works of Douglas. (из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2004George J. Stigler Journal of Political Economy. 1957. Vol. 65. No. 1. P. 1-17.
В статье рассматривается историческое развитие концепции конкуренции в ее эволюции, а также этапы внедрения в концепцию таких понятий, как совершенный рынок, единственность равновесия и условия стационарности.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003George J. Stigler Journal of Political Economy. 1957. Vol. 65. No. 1. P. 1-17.
"Ни одно понятие в экономике - и ни в какой другой области - никогда не удается определить настолько четко, чтобы его смысл оставался ясен в любых обстоятельствах" - этой фразой Стиглер начинает свой скурпулезный очерк истории возникновения и уточнения концепции "совершенная конкуренция" от классической политэкономии через маржиналистскую революцию к неоклассике.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-06-2006Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy Journal of Political Economy. 1990. Vol. 98. No. 2. P. 225-264.
Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firm's stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-07-2004Rudiger Dornbusch Journal of Political Economy. 1982. Vol. 90. No. 1. P. 158-165.
В статье рассматривается два канала влияния курсовой политики на соотношение стабильности цен и выпуска. С одной, стороны, правило паритета покупательной способности, ориентированное на поддержание реального курса на постоянном уровне, направлено на стабилизацию совокупного спроса. С другой стороны, курсовая политика влияет на совокупное предложение через цены импортируемых товаров промежуточного назначения. В модели с рациональными ожиданиями и перекрывающимися трудовыми контрактами окончательный эффект с точки зрения стабилизации выпуска и цен будет зависеть от того, насколько монетраные власти реагируют на изменение цен.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-03-2005Bengt R. Holmstrom, Jean Tirole Journal of Political Economy. 1998. Vol. 106. No. 1. P. 1-40.
This paper addresses a basic, yet unresolved, question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the state have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims, by obtaining a credit line from a financial intermediary, and by holding claims on other firms. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, we show that these instruments are sufficient for implementing the socially optimal (second-best) contract between investors and firms. However, the implementation may require an intermediary to coordinate the use of scarce liquidity, in which case contracts with the intermediary impose both a maximum leverage ratio and a liquidity constraint on firms. When there is only aggregate uncertainty, the private sector cannot satisfy its own liquidity needs. The government can improve welfare by issuing bonds that commit future consumer income. Government bonds command a liquidity premium over private claims. The government should manage debt so that liquidity is loosened (the value of bonds is high) when the aggregate liquidity shock is high and is tightened when the liquidity shock is low. The paper thus suggests a rationale both for government-supplied liquidity and for its active management.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-03-2003George J. Stigler Journal of Political Economy. 1939. Vol. 3. No. 47. P. 305-327.
Рассматриваются проблемы, возникающие при анализе производства и распределения в кратком периоде из-за того, что в его рамках экономическая теория производства взяла на вооружение исключительно гипотезу о переменных коэффициентах производства, полностью отвергая рассмотрение их в качестве постоянных.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004Craig A. Burnside, Martin Stewart Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo Journal of Political Economy. 2001. Vol. 109. No. 6. P. 1155-1197.
This paper argues that principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partly financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. Authors articulate this view using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. While the government cannot prevent a speculative attack, it can affect its timing. The longer the delay, the higher inflation will be under the subsequent flexible exchange rate regime. We present empirical evidence in support of the four key assumptions in our interpretation of the crisis: (i) the currency crises could not have been predicted on the basis of standard macroeconomic indicators; (ii) the exchange rate crises were preceded by publicly available signs of imminent banking crises; (iii) failing financial sectors were associated with large prospective government deficits; and (iv) governments were either unwilling or unable to raise the resource required to pay for bank bailouts via fiscal reforms.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Hirofumi Shibata Journal of Political Economy. 1973. Vol. 81. No. 1. P. 223-230.
Focuses on the effects of the increasing cost of public goods on the emergence of monopsony problem. Assessment of the behavior of the producers of public goods; Attitude of consumers towards potential monopoly of consumers; Expansion of production of the goods. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003John R. Jr. Lott Journal of Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 107. No. 6(2). P. 127-157.
Governments use public education and public ownership of the media to control the information that their citizens receive. More totalitarian governments as well as those with larger wealth transfers make greater investments in publicly controlled information. This finding is borne out from cross-sectional time-series evidence across countries and is confirmed when the recent fall of communism is specifically examined. My results reject the standard public-good view linking education and democracy, and I find evidence that public educational expenditures vary in similar ways to government ownership of television stations. Country-level data on the organization of families as well as data on South African public schools are also examined.
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003Gerhard Glomm, B. Ravikumar Journal of Political Economy. 1992. Vol. 100. No. 4. P. 818-834.
In this paper, we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth. We use simple functional forms for preferences, technologies, and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education. We find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education. On the other hand, private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high. We also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average.