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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Journal of Political Economy

Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Eugene F. Fama, James D. MacBeth Journal of Political Economy. 1973.  Vol. 81. No. 3. P. 607-636. 
This paper tests the relationship between average return and risk for New York Stock Exchange common stocks. The theoretical basis of the tests is the "two-parameter" portfolio model and models of market equilibrium derived from the two-parameter portfolio model. We cannot reject the hypothesis of these models that the pricing of common stocks reflects the attempts of risk-averse investors to hold portfolios that are "efficient" in terms of expected value and dispersion of return. Moreover, the observed "fair game" properties of the coefficients and residuals of the risk-return regressions are consistent with an "efficient capital market"--that is, a market where prices of securities
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004
Martin S. Feldstein Journal of Political Economy. 1987.  Vol. 95. No. 3. P. 468-484.. 
Social security retirement benefits distort the saving of workers who are rational to save for their future. Since the implicit rate of return in an unfunded social security program is less than the marginal product of capital, the resulting decline in saving causes a welfare loss. The present paper examines the conditions under which the welfare loss could be reduced by replacing the current universal social security program with a means-tested program that pays benefits only to those individuals with little or no other retirement income or assets.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 11-08-2004
Paul Anthony Samuelson Journal of Political Economy. 1964.  Vol. 72. No. 6. P. 604-606. 
There seems to be no published formulation and solution to the problem: How must "income" be defined if present discounted valuations of all assets, and therefore all optimization decisions, are to be independent of the tax rate each person is subject to?
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003
Michael Rothschild, Lawrence J. White Journal of Political Economy. 1995.  Vol. 103. No. 3. P. 573-586. 
Many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs; the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser. Higher education is the premier example; others are legion. We provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services. Prices that charge customers for what they get on net (output minus input) from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations; these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other. Few examples of such prices exist in the real world.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003
Paul H. Douglas Journal of Political Economy. 1976.  Vol. 84. No. 5. P. 903-16. 
Focuses on the Cobb-Douglas production function. History of the introduction of the function; Use of time-series analysis in formulating the function; Accuracy of the function. (Из Ebsco)
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 11-07-2005
M.J. Farrell Journal of Political Economy. 1959.  Vol. 67. No. 4. P. 377-391. 
The object of this paper is to examine how far the allocation of resources brought about by s perfectly competitive market remains optimal when indifference maps and production functions cease to be convex. It has recently been asserted that the allocative efficiency of a competitive system breaks down under these circumstances. If this true, it would constitute s serious limitation, for, as I shall argue. In the real world the relevant functions are often not convex. However, we shall see that the traditional assumptions of convexity are by no means essential to the optimality of competitive markets and that the assertions to the contrary are based on an elementary fallacy. I shall examine in some detail the behavior of competitive markets under conditions of certainty.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 16-03-2005
Ricardo J. Caballero, Mohamad L. Hammour Journal of Political Economy. 1998.  Vol. 106. No. 4. P. 724-767. 
Specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. Rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences. Resources are underutilized, factor markets are segmented, production suffers from technological "sclerosis," job creation and destruction are unbalanced, recessions are excessively sharp, and expansions run into bottlenecks. While, depending on the shock, expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization, recessions should typically be softened. In the long run, institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation. Technology choice will also be affected, with the appropriated factor partially "excluding" the other from production to reduce appropriation.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 14-05-2004
Steven Tadelis Journal of Political Economy. 2002.  Vol. 110. No. 4. P. 854-882. 
Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short-lived agents to work hard, but it is well known that these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium model with moral hazard and adverse selection generates two main results. First, incentives of young and old agents are quantitatively equal, implying that incentives are "ageless" with a market for reputations. Second, good reputations cannot act as effective sorting devices: in equilibrium, more able agents cannot outbid lesser ones in the market for good reputations. In addition, welfare analysis shows that social surplus can fall if clients observe trade in firm reputations.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Milton Friedman Journal of Political Economy. 1949.  Vol. 57. P. 463-495. 
Статья представляет интерес, главным образом, для специалистов в области теории потребления или историков экономической мысли, так как содержит скурпулезный анализ принципов построения кривой спроса в связи с различиями между номинальным и реальным доходом. Как обычно, Маршаллу "достается" за нелюбовь к строгим определениям и избегания математики.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003
Harold Demsetz Journal of Political Economy. 1959.  Vol. 67. No. 1. P. 21-30. 
В рамках статьи рассматривается проблематика рыночного равновесия в условиях монополистической конкуренции. Автор статьи ставит под сомнение обоснованность выводов классичесой работы Чембрелина 1933 года о существовании т.н. "избыточных мощностей" в отрасли с данной рыночной структурой. Анализ Демсецом ситуации равновесия на рынке монополистической конкуренции (с точки зрения проблем эффективности) приводит его к выводу, что избыточные мощности не являются строгим следствием условий, лежащих в основе модели Чемберлина.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Fisher Black, Myron Scholes Journal of Political Economy. 1973.  Vol. 81. No. 3. P. 637-654. 
If options are correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to make sure profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in options and their underlying stocks. Using this principle, a theoretical valuation formula for options is derived. Since almost all corporate liabilities can be viewed as combinations of options, the formula and the analysis that led to it are also applicable to corporate liabilities such as common stock, corporate bonds, and warrants. In particular, the formula can be used to derive the discount that should be applied to a corporate bond because of the possibility of default.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 19-03-2003
P. Daly, E. Olson, Paul H. Douglas Journal of Political Economy. 1943.  Vol. 51. No. 1. P. 61-65. 
Анализируются взаимосвязи между используемыми в обрабатывающем секторе промышленности объемами труда, капитала и выпуском продукции, которые выражаются производственной функцией определенного типа. Исследование опирается на эмпирический материал о состоянии американской экономики в 1904 г.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
J.F. Weston Journal of Political Economy. 1954.  Vol. 62. No. 2. P. 152-170. 
Статья посвящена обзору дискуссий о природе прибыли. В рамках статьи наибольший акцент делается на теории неопределенности как обосновании существования прибыли как экономического явления.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Kiminori Matsuyama Journal of Political Economy. 2002.  Vol. 110. No. 5. P. 1035-1070. 
This paper studies mechanisms behind the rise of mass consumption societies. The development process depicted follows the Flying Geese pattern, in which a series of industries take off one after another. As productivity improves in these industries, each consumer good becomes affordable to an increasingly large number of households, which constantly expand the range of goods they consume. This in turn generates larger markets for consumer goods, which leads to further improvement in productivity. For such virtuous cycles of productivity gains and expanding markets to occur, income distribution should be neither too equal nor too unequal. With too much equality, the economy stagnates in a poverty trap. With too much inequality, the development stops prematurely.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-10-2004
Richard A. Posner Journal of Political Economy. 1975.  Vol. 83. No. 3. P. 807-828. 
This paper presents a model and some highly tentative empirical estimates of the social costs of monopoly and monopoly-inducing regulation in the United States. Unlike the previous studies, it assumes that competition to obtain a monopoly results in the transformation of expected monopoly profits into social costs. A major conclusion is that public regulation is probably a larger source of social costs than private monopoly. The implications of the analysis for several public policy issues, such as appropriate policy toward mergers and price discrimination, are also discussed.
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