Journal of Political Economy
1939 1940 1943 1947 1949 1954 1956 1957 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 1967 1969 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Выпуск N6 за 2001 год
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004Craig A. Burnside, Martin Stewart Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo Journal of Political Economy. 2001. Vol. 109. No. 6. P. 1155-1197.
This paper argues that principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partly financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. Authors articulate this view using a simple dynamic general equilibrium model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. While the government cannot prevent a speculative attack, it can affect its timing. The longer the delay, the higher inflation will be under the subsequent flexible exchange rate regime. We present empirical evidence in support of the four key assumptions in our interpretation of the crisis: (i) the currency crises could not have been predicted on the basis of standard macroeconomic indicators; (ii) the exchange rate crises were preceded by publicly available signs of imminent banking crises; (iii) failing financial sectors were associated with large prospective government deficits; and (iv) governments were either unwilling or unable to raise the resource required to pay for bank bailouts via fiscal reforms.