Journal of Monetary Economics
Выпуск N2 за 2005 год
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Niklas J. Westelius Journal of Monetary Economics. 2005. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 477-496.
Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.