Journal of Monetary Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2007Bruce Preston Journal of Monetary Economics. 2006. Vol. 53. No. 3. P. 507-535.
This paper argues that recently popular forecast-based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations. In a New Keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi-period decision problems, but have non-rational expectations and learn over time, if the monetary authority adopts a forecast-based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics. A central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts. This suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Pierpaolo Benigno, Gianluca Benigno Journal of Monetary Economics. 2006. Vol. 53. No. 3. P. 473-506.
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers. It is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained-efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-12-2007Malin Andersson, Hans Dillén, Peter Sellin Journal of Monetary Economics. 2006. Vol. 53. No. 8. P. 1815-1855.
This paper examines how various monetary policy signals such as repo rate changes, inflation reports, speeches, and minutes from monetary policy meetings affect the term structure of interest rates. We find that unexpected movements in the short end of the yield curve are mainly driven by unexpected changes in the repo rate. However, published inflation reports and speeches also have some impact on short rates. Speeches are found to be a more important determinant for the longer end of the term structure. Our conclusion is that central bank communication is an essential part of the conduct of monetary policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Federico Ravenna, Carl E. Walsh Journal of Monetary Economics. 2006. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 199-216.
In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary policy.