American Political Science Review
Опубликовано на портале: 25-05-2009
Torben Iversen, David Soskice, Thomas R. Cusack
American Political Science Review.
2007.
Vol. 110.
No. 3.
P. 373-391 .
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
David Soskice, Torben Iversen
American Political Science Review.
2006.
Vol. 100.
No. 2.
P. 165-181.
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable
variance
in government redistribution across democracies. We show that the electoral system
plays a key
role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing
coalitions,
whether these are conceived as electoral alliances between classes or alliances between
class
parties. Our argument implies a) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems,
while
center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems, and b) that PR systems
redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for
redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2002
Jonathan Kelley, Ian McAllister, Anthony Mughan
American Political Science Review.
1985.
Vol. 79.
No. 3.
Class has long been the preeminent source of political conflict in industrial society,
but its electoral influence has declined in recent years. The sources of the decline
are not yet firmly established, and moreover the implications for political parties
remain unclear. The decline-of-class hypothesis states that parties on the left will
decline as the working class becomes more affluent and adopts middle-class styles
of conduct. By contrast, the party-appeals hypothesis suggests that as the electorate
becomes more middle class, parties of the left will alter their appeals to encompass
the growing middle class and so offset the shrinkage of their traditional working-class
constituency. This article applies multivariate anaysis to survey data collected
in England between 1964 and 1979 to test four specific hypotheses derived from the
two scenarios. The results support the decline-of-class theory's prediction that
economic development erodes the working-class bases of left-wing parties, but not
its claim that the left-wing party's vote declines proportionately. Rather, the results
suggest that parties are apparently able to change their appeals to reduce their
losses, as argued by the party-appeals theory, but not to eliminate them. It seems
that their are restraints on parties' ability to change their appeals, limitations
not envisioned by the party appeals theory.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2004
Nathaniel L. Beck, Jonathan N. Katz
American Political Science Review.
1995.
Vol. 89.
No. 3.
P. 634-647.
We examine some issues in the estimation of time-series cross-section models, calling
into question the conclusions of many published studies, particularly in the field
of comparative political economy. We show that the generalized least squares approach
of Parks produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence, often underestimating
variability by 50% or more. We also provide an alternative estimator of the standard
errors that is correct when the error structures show complications found in this
type of model. Monte Carlo analysis shows that these "panel-corrected standard errors"
perform well. The utility of our approach is demonstrated via a reanalysis of one
"social democratic corporatist" model.
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