American Economic Review
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Dani Rodrik American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 140-144.
Few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development. Yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking. In this paper, attention is drawn to regularity in the cross-national data that has received little attention to date: participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability. After presenting some of the evidence, it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise. Three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Hal R. Varian American Economic Review. 1985. Vol. 75. No. 4. P. 870-875.
Studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory. Features of the reservation model presented; Quasi-linear utility and consumers' surplus; Upper and lower bounds on welfare change; Bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2003Bradford DeLong American Economic Review. 1988. Vol. 78. No. 5. P. 1138-1154.
Данная статья построена на критике подхода к анализу проблемы конвергенции, изложенному в статье Baumol (1986). Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show. American Economic Review, Vol. 76(5): 1072-1085. Де Лонг подвергает сомнению методологию Баумоля и предлагает свой вариант исследования.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-12-2007Bradford DeLong American Economic Review. 1988. Vol. 78. No. 5. P. 1138-1154.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003William Jack Baumol American Economic Review. 1986. No. 76(5). P. 1072-1085.
Maddison's 1870-1979 data are analyzed, showing the historically unprecedented growth in productivity, gross domestic product per capita and exports and the remarkable convergence of productivities of industrialized market economies, with convergence apparently shared by planned economies but not less developed countries. Productivity lag's relation to "deindustrialization," unemployment, and balance of payments is examined. The data are shown to suggest a tempered view of the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth and its lag behind other countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John McLaren American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 5. P. 1239-1254.
This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical integration. Vertical integration can confer a negative externality, by thinning the market for inputs and thus worsening opportunism problems; this induces strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria in the integration decision, thus providing a theory of different industrial systems or industrial cultures in ex ante identical countries. International openness thickens the market, facilitating leaner, less integrated firms, thus providing gains from international openness quite different from those that are familiar from trade theory. This may be taken as one theory of outsourcing, downsizing, and Japanization as consequences of globalization.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002William Darity American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 308-311.
International racial and ethnic economic inequality is examined. The international record shows disparity across nations and regions, between racial and ethnic groups within countries, and within groups in the same country. Subalternate racial and ethnic populations, whether in the majority or minority, suffer remarkably similar economic outcomes across the globe. Institutional racism and cultural discrimination affect subcultures and different classes in multiple ways. In every country, those who get the short stick continue to face poor prospects for economic inclusion and justice.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Brian L. Goff, Robert E. McCormick, Robert D. Tollison American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. No. 1. P. 16-26.
This paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial discretion. Data on the racial integration of Major League Baseball and Atlantic Coast Conference basketball are employed to address this issue. The central question examined is which type of team integrated first - losers or winners. The results strongly support the idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry; that is, winning teams led the process of racial integration.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Paul Anthony Samuelson American Economic Review. 1973. Vol. 63. No. 4. P. 770-71.
Explains the taxonomy of changing factor shares in a competitive industry as factor supplies (or prices) shift. Description of the neoclassical production function; Changes in factors that are related to the partial elasticities concepts; Duality relations that hold for the minimum-unit cost function. (Из Ebsco)
Rents, competition, and corruption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Alberto Ades, Rafael Di Tella American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 982-993.
Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Hanming Fang American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 4. P. 924-937.
The connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as social culture. In the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology, it is shown that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some cultural activity, the society can partially overcome an informational free-riding problem. Therefore, social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2004Jon Gruber, David A. Wise American Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 88. No. 2. P. 158-163.
This article concerns the following items: 1) Decline in labour-force participation; 2) Social Security benefit accrual and the implicit tax on work; 3) The importance of the early-retirement age; 4) The implicit tax on work and labour-force participation; etc.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2004Daron K. Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 1. P. 194-211.
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-04-2004Olivier Jean Blanchard, Danny Quah American Economic Review. 1989. Vol. 79. No. 4. P. 655-673.
We interpret fluctuations in GNP and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances: disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not. We interpret the first as supply disturbances, the second as demand disturbances. Demand disturbances have a hump-shaped mirror-image effect on output and unemployment. The effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time, peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003Daniel A. Graham, John M. Vernon American Economic Review. 1975. Vol. 65. No. 5. P. 1032-1036.
Comments on S. Besen and R. Soligo's article about the economics of the network-affiliate relationships in the television broadcasting industry in the U.S. Sale of advertising time on network programs; Supply curve of cleared time; Definition of the nondiscrinating monopsonist solution; Demand for network programming. (Из Ebsco)