American Economic Review
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Выпуск N4 за 1999 год
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Gordon B. Dahl, Michael R. Ransom American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 703-727.
Economists and psychologists argue that individuals skew personal beliefs to accord with their own interests. To test for this presence of self-serving beliefs, 1,200 members of the Mormon Church were surveyed about tithing. A tithe is a voluntary contribution equal to 10% of income. Since respondents must decide privately what income items to tithe, how the income definition depends on an individual's religious and financial incentives was observed. Surprisingly little evidence was found that an individual's financial situation influences beliefs about what counts as income for the tithe. However, ambiguity increases the role for self-serving biases.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John Duffy American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 847-877.
Findings are reported from an experiment that implements a search-theoretic model of money as a medium of exchange. The question is whether subjects learn to adopt the same commodities as media of exchange that the model predicts will be used in equilibrium. It is reported that subjects have a strong tendency to play fundamental rather than speculative strategies even in environments where speculative strategies yield higher payoffs. Some possible motivations for subjects' behavior are examined, and it is concluded that subjects are mainly motivated by past payoff experience as opposed to the marketability considerations that the theory emphasizes.
Rents, competition, and corruption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Alberto Ades, Rafael Di Tella American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 982-993.
Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Jonathan A. Parker American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 959-973.
The key implication of rational expectations and the basic life-cycle/permanent-income hypothesis: that predictable changes in income have no effect on the growth rate of consumption expenditures, is examined. This implication is important for understanding the effectiveness and optimal timing of fiscal policy, the causes and propagation of business cycles, and the effects of income fluctuations on the growth rate of the economy. Using household-level consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, whether expenditures on nondurable goods increase contemporaneously with predictable changes in Social Security tax withholding is tested. It is found that households do change their consumption expenditures in response to the predictable fluctuations in income induced by the Social Security tax system.