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American Economic Review

Выпуск N2 за 1999 год

Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Rachel Croson, Nancy Buchan American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 386-39. 
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economic models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. Gender differences in bargaining are examined using the trust game introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). In this two-person game, the proposer is given a choice of sending some, all, or none of his or her $10 experimental payment to an anonymous partner, the responder. For US subjects, Berg et al. found that 30 of 32 proposers deviated from economic equilibrium and sent some money to their partners. In sending money, proposers are trusting that their partners will return some money to them. In addition, 24 out of 32 of responders who received money returned some. Gender differences in this game are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Donna K. Ginther, Kathy J. Hayes American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 397-402. 
In their annual review of academic salaries, the American Association of University Professors observes large gender-related salary differentials. At doctoral-level institutions, male professors at the rank of full professor earn 11.4% more than women full professors. Data on academic labor markets from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to evaluate gender differences in salaries and promotion probabilities. Differences in employment outcomes by gender are found using two methods: the Oaxaca decomposition is used to examine salary differentials, and duration analysis is used to estimate promotion to tenure. While gender salary differences can largely be explained by academic rank, substantial gender differences in promotion to tenure exist after controlling for productivity, demographic characteristics, and primary work activity.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Harriet Orcott Duleep, Mark C. Regets American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 186-191. 
The following question is approached theoretically and empirically: Why do immigrants invest more in human capital than the native-born, and how do investment patterns vary by type of immigrant? It is found that greater immigrant human capital investment is due to the lower opportunity costs of investment by immigrants lacking US-specific skills and the role of untransferred human capital as a factor of production for destination-country skills, as well as the higher return to investment spending from the complementarity of foreign and US human capital. This theoretical insight is supported by direct evidence of human capital investment and by empirical analyses.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Haizhou Huang, Chenggang Xu American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 438-443. 
The fundamental importance of economic institutions for economic growth through their impact on technological change has long been argued by Joseph Schumpter and others. Recent empirical studies have reconfirmed such arguments. Robert Barro (1997) finds that economic and political institutions are the most important factors in explaining differences in growth across economies. New growth theory has made major breakthroughs in endogenizing technological changes. However, although some insightful and inspiring discussions of institutional impacts of innovation are provided, there is little attempt in these models to explain what, aside from capital, labor inputs, and knowledge accumulation, determines innovation. An attempt is made to fill the gap in literature by examining how financial institutions affect technological innovation and thus affect growth.