American Economic Review
1940 1942 1946 1948 1953 1955 1958 1959 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 433-438.
Cognition requires scarce inputs, including time and concentration. Since cognition is costly, sophisticated decision-makers should use mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to reduce cognitive burdens. A model is proposed and tested that is motivated by these principles. It is believed this model achieves four goals. First, the model makes quantitative behavioral predictions and, hence, provides a precise alternative to the rational-actor hypothesis. Second, the model is psychologically plausible because it is based on the actual decisions algorithms that subjects claim to use. Third, the model is empirically testable; such a test is provided in this paper. Fourth, the model is broadly applicable, because it can be used to analyze decision problems that can be represented in tree form.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Kristin J. Forbes American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 4. P. 869-887.
This paper challenges the current belief that income inequality has a negative relationship with economic growth. It uses an improved data set on income inequality which not only reduces measurement error, but also allows estimation via a panel technique. Results suggest that in the short and medium term, an increase in a country's level of income inequality has a significant positive relationship with subsequent economic growth.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 4. P. 980-994.
This paper shows experimentally that there is a widespread willingness of cooperators to punish free-riders. Results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, evidence is provided that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Lois Joy American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 471-475.
Do gender differences in college majors and qualifications account for gender differences in labor market outcomes? For the overwhelming majority of men and women, The Baccalauarate and Beyond Longitudinal Study data suggest that the answer is no. Within the majority of majors and occupations, men earn more than women in first jobs. The exception to this is for science and humanities majors, were men do not obtain a wage advantage over women. However, even within the sciences, women are more than twice as likely as men to end up in clerical first jobs, which are considered by students to be among the least satisfactory jobs.
Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Joseph Henrich American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 4. P. 973-979.
This article addresses the assumptions that humans everywhere deploy the same cognitive machinery for making economic decisions and, consequently, will respond similarly when faced with comparable economic circumstances. These assumptions are addressed with experimental evidence from the Peruvian Amazon.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002George Loewenstein American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 426-432.
Economists have not explicitly denied the existence and significance of visceral factors but have traditionally left them out of their analyses, whether because their influence is perceived as transient and hence unimportant, or because they are seen as too unpredictable and complex to be amenable to formal modeling. An attempt is made to show that both of these assumptions are false. Visceral factors have important, but often underappreciated, consequences for behavior. Moreover, both the determinants of visceral factors and their impact on behavior are not only systematic, but amenable to formal modeling.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-07-2003Peter Howitt American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 4. P. 829-846.
In this study, a multicountry Schumpeterian growth model is constructed. Because of technology transfer, R&D-performing countries converge to parallel growth paths; other countries stagnate. A parameter change that would have raised a country's growth rate in standard Schumpeterian theory will permanently raise its productivity and per capita income relative to other countries and raise the world growth rate. Transitional dynamics are analyzed for each country and for the world economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Finis Welch American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 444-449.
Although increased wage inequality among men during the past three decades has received more attention, the growth in women's wages has been equally remarkable. In fact, by one measure of inequality, the ninth-decile/median ratio, the proportional growth in inequality has moved in exact proportion with the female/male wage ratio. It is suggested that both result from expansion in the value of brains relative to brawn. There is no way of knowing the full story of growth in women's relative wages, and it is important not to dismiss the import of changing career patterns. As is evident in the panel data, increasing labor market participation must be important. So, too, are the implications that follow the movement of women from the home to the job.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Karen E. Dynan American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 3. P. 391-406.
This paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data. A simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time. When the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency. This finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification. It also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining PSID variables with weights estimated from Consumer Expenditure Survey data.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Wei-Yin Hu American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 368-372.
Analysis of longitudinal data for immigrants presents a more pessimistic portrait of immigrants' economic success. First, the rate of growth of immigrant earnings was overstated in census-based studies. Second, the worsening of immigrant earnings for more recent arrival cohorts is deeper than previously suggested. Against these two negative findings, one must keep in mind an important caveat. The steeper cohort decline in earnings may be a sign of greater human-capital investment by more recent immigrants. Longitudinal data suggest a strong degree of earnings convergence: immigrants who start at lower earnings quickly make up a large part of the deficit relative to their immigrant counterparts.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John Hassler, Jose V. Rodriguez Mora American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 4. P. 888-908.
This study develops a model where the allocation of human resources, intergenerational social mobility, and technological growth are jointly determined. High growth endogenously increases the equilibrium return to innate cognitive ability and makes the allocation of individuals depend more on innate ability and less on social background. A social allocation based on innate ability and high growth will thus reinforce each other, implying the possibility of multiple endogenous growth equilibria.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Dani Rodrik American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 140-144.
Few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development. Yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking. In this paper, attention is drawn to regularity in the cross-national data that has received little attention to date: participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability. After presenting some of the evidence, it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise. Three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John McLaren American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 5. P. 1239-1254.
This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical integration. Vertical integration can confer a negative externality, by thinning the market for inputs and thus worsening opportunism problems; this induces strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria in the integration decision, thus providing a theory of different industrial systems or industrial cultures in ex ante identical countries. International openness thickens the market, facilitating leaner, less integrated firms, thus providing gains from international openness quite different from those that are familiar from trade theory. This may be taken as one theory of outsourcing, downsizing, and Japanization as consequences of globalization.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002William Darity American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 308-311.
International racial and ethnic economic inequality is examined. The international record shows disparity across nations and regions, between racial and ethnic groups within countries, and within groups in the same country. Subalternate racial and ethnic populations, whether in the majority or minority, suffer remarkably similar economic outcomes across the globe. Institutional racism and cultural discrimination affect subcultures and different classes in multiple ways. In every country, those who get the short stick continue to face poor prospects for economic inclusion and justice.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2004Daron K. Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 1. P. 194-211.
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income.