Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2
Alquist R. Productivity and the euro-dollar exchange rate puzzle [Текст] / R. Alquist, M. D. Chin. Cambridge : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002. 29 p. (NBER working paper series ; 8824). [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-07-2004
This paper documents the evidence for a productivity based model of the dollar/euro real exchange rate over the 1985-2001 period. Authors estimate cointegrating relationships between the real exchange rate, productivity, and the real price of oil using the Johansen (1988) and Stock-Watson (1993) procedures. They find that each percentage point in the US-Euro area productivity differential results in a five percentage point real appreciation of the dollar. This finding is robust to the estimation methodology, the variables included in the regression, and the sample period. Authors conjecture that productivity-based models cannot explain the observed patterns with the standard set of assumptions, and describe a case in which the model can be reconciled with the observed data.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003Alan J. Auerbach, Kevin A. Hassett
This paper explores optimal fiscal policy in an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model under uncertainty and the impact on optimal policy of the introduction of a type of policy stickiness intended to account for the stylized fact that major reforms happen infrequently. In general, our analysis suggests not only that action should not be delayed, but further that action should actually be accelerated. The added realism of restrictions on the frequency of policy changes alters this result in two ways. The prospect of being unable to set policy in the future occasions even more precautionary saving today, if the government acts. However, the government may also choose not to set policy, and its inaction range is very asymmetric. Because the impact of its policies on the current elderly cannot be reversed in the future, the government is much more likely to choose inaction when fiscal tightening is called for. Thus, the optimal policy response over time might best be characterized by great caution in general, but punctuated by occasional periods of apparent irresponsibility.