Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 3
Опубликовано на портале: 27-04-2004G. Andrew Karolyi, Rene M. Stulz
Authors review the international finance literature to assess the extent to which international factors affect financial asset demands and prices. International asset pricing models with mean-variance investors predict that an asset's risk premium depends on its covariance with the world market portfolio and, possibly, with exchange rate changes. The existing empirical evidence shows that a country's risk premium depends on its covariance with the world market portfolio and that there is some evidence that exchange rate risk affects expected returns. However, the theoretical asset pricing literature relying on mean-variance optimizing investors fails in explaining the portfolio holdings of investors, equity flows, and the time-varying properties of correlations across countries. The home bias has the effect of increasing local influences on asset prices, while equity flows and cross-country correlations increase global influences on asset prices.
Odious Debt [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran
Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2004Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld
Boston: Addison Wesley Higher Education, 2003
International Economics: Theory and Policy is the best-selling textbook in the field written by two of the world's leading economists, Paul R. Krugman of Princeton University and Maurice Obstfeld of the University of California, Berkeley. The Sixth Edition provides an up-to-date and understandable analytical framework for illuminating current events and new research findings in the dynamic field of international economics. This new edition has been thoroughly revised to reflect the changes of today's global economic landscape, including the unprecedented expansion of globalization, the increasingly crucial nature of international economic relations, the gains from trade, and recent anti-globalization controversies such as the continuing debate over the optimal level of trade. Consistent with previous editions, the authors also present an integrated treatment of the Ricardian model, specific factors, factor endowments, and imperfect competition models of trade, along with in-depth analysis of empirical evidence. They cover the effects and causes of trade policy and the income-distribution effects of trade, and also provide a unified model of open-economy macroeconomics, based on an asset-market approach to exchange rate determination with a central role for expectations.