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Макроэкономика - раздел современной экономической теории, в рамках которого изучаются такие феномены как экономический рост, колебания деловой активности, инфляция и безработица, а также вопросы макроэкономической политики. (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 4

Книги

Авторы:
все А БВ Г Д ЕЖЗИЙК ЛМ НОПРСТ УФ ХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
A B C D E F G H I J K L M NO PQR S T U V WXYZ
 
Названия:
АБВГД ЕЖЗИ ЙКЛМ НО ПР С ТУФ ХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
A BCD E F G HI JKL M N O P QR ST U VWXYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003
Tapio Palokangas
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Collective bargaining is still the main vehicle for labour worldwide to negotiate wages, benefits, retirement policies, training and other terms of working with management in both the public and private sectors. Labour economists have long been active in modelling the relations between collective bargaining agreements, labour markets, and social welfare conditions. This book presents a new theoretical model of unions which offers a unified treatment of the centralization of bargaining, the credibility of labour contracts, the unionization of labour markets and the relative bargaining power of the union. Part I of the book develops the microfoundations of bargaining and examines collective bargaining interacting with public policy, investment and growth, and international trade and specialization. In conclusion Professor Palokangas challenges the commonly held view that collective bargaining has a negative impact on economics welfare, and argues that with the existence of market failure, collective bargaining can be welfare enhancing.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию) ресурс содержит прикрепленный файл

Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
2003
This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simply Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2003
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
Изд-во: MIT Press, 2000, cерия "Zeuthen Lectures", 551 с.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.

Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003
James Michael Poterba
2003
The design of budget rules and institutions, long a neglected area in public finance and macroeconomics, has recently been thrust to center stage by the debate over a balanced budget amendment and other deficit-reduction measures in the United States. This paper describes the existing evidence on how budget rules affect fiscal policy outcomes. It contrasts the `institutional irrelevance view,' which holds that budget rules can be circumvented by modifying accounting practices and changing the nominal timing or other classification of taxes and expenditures, with the `public choice view' in which fiscal institutions represent important constraints on the behavior of political actors. Several distinct strands of empirical evidence, from the U.S. federal experience with anti-deficit rules, from U.S. state experience with balanced budget rules, and from international comparisons of budget outcomes in nations with different fiscal institutions, suggest that fiscal institutions do matter. These results reject the institutional irrelevance view. The existing evidence is not refined enough, however, to provide detailed advice on how narrowly-defined changes in budget rules might affect policy outcomes.