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Макроэкономика - раздел современной экономической теории, в рамках которого изучаются такие феномены как экономический рост, колебания деловой активности, инфляция и безработица, а также вопросы макроэкономической политики. (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2

Книги

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А БВ Г Д ЕЖЗИЙК ЛМ НОПРСТ УФ ХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
A B C D E F G H I J K L M NO P QR S T U V WXYZ
 
Названия:
все АБВГД ЕЖЗИ ЙКЛМ НО ПР С ТУФ ХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
A BCD E F G HI JKL M N OP QR ST U VWXYZ
 

Odious Debt [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran
2003
Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans.

Опубликовано на портале: 29-08-2003
Robert J. Barro
2003
A tax-smoothing objective is used to assess the optimal consumption of public debt with respect to maturity and contingencies. This objective motivates the government to make its debt payout contingent on the levels of public outlay and the tax base. If these contingencies are present, but asset prices of non-contingent indexed debt are stochastic, then full tax smoothing dictates an optimal maturity structure of the non-contingent debt. If the certainty-equivalent outlays are the same for each period then the government should guarantee equal real payouts in each period, that is, the debt takes the form of indexed consols. This structure insulates the government's budget constraint from unpredictable variations in the market prices of indexed bonds of various maturities. If contingent debt is precluded, then the government may want to depart from a consol maturity structure to exploit covariances among public outlay, the tax base, and the term structure of real interest rates. However, if moral hazard is the reason for the preclusion of contingent debt, then this consideration also deters exploitation of these covariances and tends to return the optimal solution to the consol maturity structure. The issue of nominal bonds may allow the government to exploit the covariances among public outlay, the tax base, and the rate of inflation. But if moral-hazard explains the absence of contingent debt, then the same reasoning tends to make nominal debt issue undesirable. The bottom line is that an optimal-tax approach to public debt favors bonds that are indexed and long term.