Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 7
Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003Scott E. Masten
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996
The purpose of this book is to introduce the empirically-based literature on contracting and organization to a student audience. This literature derives from the work of R.H. Coase, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991. It includes studies of a wide range of industries, including aerospace, automotive, electric power generation, fast food, petroleum, coke, soft drink distribution, shoe manufacturing, timber harvesting, transportation, and tuna processing. More important than any of the specific industries or practices represented is that each study illustrates important principles of organization that generalize to commercial transactions in other settings.
Mattei U. Comparative law and economics / U. Mattei. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. 266 p. [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-10-2003
Mattei shows how concepts from economics can be applied to the study of comparative law. He then applies the concepts to several significant problems in comparative law, including the history and sources of law, differences between civil and common law systems, and the reasons for legal change and the movement of law from one country to another. He looks at specific problems in property, contracts, and trust law. Finally he uses the insights he has developed to understand the issues involved in changing law in developing countries and in formerly socialist countries.
Lane J.-E. Comparative political economy: A developmental approach / J.-E. Lane, S. Ersson. 2nd ed. London; Washington: Pinter, 1997. 280 p. [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2003
Comparative Political Economy is a student's introduction to the comparative analysis of nations, public policy and economic affluence. It surveys the dominant theoretical approaches and describes the countries: developed Western countries, rapidly changing East European nations, and states in the Third World. Economic, social, and political developments are analysed at length and the basis concepts - democracy versus authoritarian systems and capitalist systems versus socialist ones - are employed to illuminate similarities and differences between politico-economic systems in the world. It explores the conditions for political democracy as well as the conditions for economic growth, applying quantitative techniques to crucial problems in political economy cocerning the interaction between politics and economics.
Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-12-2005Torben Iversen
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, cерия "Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics", 221 с.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Antoine Reberioux, Michel Aglietta
Изд-во: Edward Elgar, 2005, 320 с.
Recent corporate governance scandals have brought to the fore the inherent contradictions of a capitalism dominated by financial markets. This challenging book by Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux argues that capitalism’s basic premise - that companies must be managed in the sole interest of their shareholders - is incongruent with the current environment of liquid markets, profit-hungry investors and chronic financial instability. The authors advocate rather that a company should be managed as an institution where common objectives are developed for all stakeholders, and that this democratic principle should be extended to the management of collective savings to reduce macro-financial instability. These two conditions, they contend, could make contemporary capitalism a vehicle for social progress. In this context, Corporate Governance Adrift also analyzes the financial scandals of the Enron era, going beyond the malfunctioning of the gatekeepers to stress the failure of shareholder value and the inadequacy of measures intended to prevent such scandals. This provocative and unique volume will be required reading for all scholars and researchers of industrial organization and strategy of the firm, finance and corporate governance. Policymakers, financial commentators and those involved in business will also find this book of great interest and value.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson
Ред.: Masahiko Aoki, Hideaki Miyajima
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 0199284512, 416 с.
This book uses comparative institutional analysis to explain differences in national economic performance. Countries have their own rules for corporate governance and they have different market arrangements; and these differences in rules and organization affect the way firms behave. Countries also tend to develop conventions of organizational architechture of firms, whether their hierarchies are functional, horizontal, or decentralized. This affects the way in which they process information, and information management is increasingly seen as being of crucial importance to a firm's performance. Aoki accords more importance to these factors than to the factors conventionally used in applying a neoclassical model of economic efficiency. He applies game theory, contract theory, and information theory. By describing the rules and norms in Japan, the USA, and the transitional economies, Aoki shows how firms can achieve competitive advantage in international markets if these conventions and rules are well suited to the industrial sector in which the firms operate. He is particularly concerned with how Japan, with its main bank and lifelong employment systems, as well as information-sharing firm organizational structure, might reform its institutions to maintain competitive advantage in the world economy.
Rose-Ackerman S. Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform / S. Rose-Ackerman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 266 p. [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2003
This book suggests how high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. Corruption creates economic inefficiencies and inequities, but reforms are possible to reduce the material benefits from payoffs. Corruption is not just an economic problem, however; it is also intertwined with politics. Reform may require changes in both constitutional structures and the underlying relationship of the market and the state. Effective reform cannot occur unless both the international community and domestic political leaders support change.