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А Б В Г Д Е ЖЗ И ЙК Л М Н О П Р С Т У ФХ Ц Ч Ш ЩЭЮ Я
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Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
2003
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision.

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2003
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
Изд-во: MIT Press, 2000, cерия "Zeuthen Lectures", 551 с.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.

Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-11-2003
John Cullis, Philip Jones
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 446 с.
Are the way in which governments tax and spend efficient, and are they equitable? These questions are central to public sector economics and this second edition of Public Finance and Public Choice illustrates the controversies which surround them. This new edition continues to focus on both the social optimality and public choice approaches but also includes alternative perspectives. This successful text has been extensively rewritten, offering further microeconomic insight and additional examples of the application of theory. New sections include: The private provision of public goods Privatization The quasi market The EC budget QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years) Public debt The impact of the public sector on economic growth. This clearly written, rigorous text offers a complete course in the economics of the public sector. It will be an indispensable text for students studying public economics, and also for students taking technical public policy or public administration courses. Readership: Main market is advanced undergraduates (second/third year undergraduates in UK and Europe) majoring in economics taking a course option entitled Public Economics. A relevant course may also be taught on Politics, Government or Public Administration degrees, entitled Public Finance, or Public Administration.
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Опубликовано на портале: 13-04-2004
Randall G. Holcombe
Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1996
The subject matter of public finance has evolved a great deal in the last half of the twentieth century. Earlier in the century, when government activity fell within limited and well-defined boundaries, public finance was primarily the study of taxation. As government has grown, public finance economists have become increasingly interested in public expenditures, both from the standpoint of analyzing the actual expenditures of governments and from the standpoint of developing a theory of public expenditures. Public expenditure theory provides a rationale for government activity and can help guide policymakers toward the design of more effective public programs. In the decades since World War II, the study of public finance has been extended to examine the public sector decision-making process to understand how resources are allocated within political institutions. Public policy, after all, is not the product of policy experts but rather is the result of democratic decision making. A complete understanding of the public sector must incorporate an understanding of those political institutions that actually produce public policy. This book attempts to integrate the study of the various aspects of public finance by viewing all the government's activities as a result of the democratic decision-making process. This theme manifests itself throughout the book. For example, the tax system is examined not only in terms of traditional equity and efficiency criteria but also as a product of a democratic decision-making process. The analysis of public expenditures is also developed within the context of the public sector decision-making process that produces expenditure programs. Likewise, government regulations and intergovernmental relations are viewed as products of collective decision making and are analyzed the same way. To provide a foundation for this approach, the book contains three chapters devoted specifically to an economic analysis of political institutions. Thorough coverage of these chapters is not necessary to understand the rest of the book, but, for those who are interested in studying the allocation of resources through political markets in the public sector in the same way that economics analyzes the private sector, these chapters should prove helpful. A distinguishing feature of this book is that it analyzes political institutions in much more detail than do most public finance books and therefore creates a closer tie between economic analysis and public policy.

The unifying theme of this text-that government activity is the result of a democratic decision-making process-is significant for two reasons. First, one’s understanding of public finance will be incomplete unless one understands the process by which democratic decision making has created the existing public sector institutions. Second, unlike the invisible hand of the market that is the result of human action but not of human design, the public sector of the economy is the result of conscious human design, so that every voter plays a part in the process. The better the process is understood, the more likely we are to design public sector institutions that behave as we intended. By analyzing public revenues and expenditures in the United States economy as a product of the democratic decision-making process, the many aspects of public finance can be presented as a unified body of knowledge rather than as a collection of different models of the public sector.
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