Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 3
Книги
Авторы: |
Названия: |
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Fernando Vega-Redondo
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 512 с.
This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions
of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed
description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying
basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information,
and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion
set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic
analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination
failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions.
The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the
so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of
players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer
abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between
evolution and rationality.



Evolutionary Game Theory [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Jorgen W. Weibull
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995, 287 с.
This text introduces current evolutionary game theory - where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet - emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted
to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social
evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.




Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Fernando Vega-Redondo
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 209 с.
The book covers the modern developments in Evolutionary Game Theory, with an emphasis
on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated
within the field of theoretical biology, focusing on the core notions of Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy and Replicator Dynamics. Both the static and dynamic approaches of
this biological literature are presented in detail, and the general analysis illustrated
with numerous examples. It then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework
that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary
perspective. After a discussion of strictly deterministic dynamic models, stochastic
perturbations are introduced in order to account for the social- and individual-based
sources of ‘noise’ (including aggregate shocks, agents’ experimentation,
and population renewal), which play an important role in evolutionary processes.Evolutionary
Theory has become one of the leading approaches to understanding bounded rationality,
learning, and change in complex social environments. The recent boom experienced
by this discipline makes this book's systematic presentation of its fundamental contributions
essential reading for any newcomer to the field. In addition, new avenues of research
are suggested, and plentiful examples illustrate the theory's potential applications.


