Книги

It all started with von Neumann and Morgenstern half a century ago. Their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior gave birth to a whole new area of mathematics concerned with the formal problems of rational decision as experienced by multiple agents. Now, game theory is all around us, making its way even into regular conversations. In the present book, Mehlmann presents mathematical foundations and concepts illustrated via social quandaries, mock political battles, evolutionary confrontations, economic struggles, and literary conflict. Most of the standard models--the prisoners' dilemma, the arms race, evolution, duels, the game of chicken, etc.--are here. Many non-standard examples are also here: the Legend of Faust, shootouts in the movies, the Madness of Odysseus, to name a few. The author uses familiar formulas, fables, and paradoxes to guide readers through what he calls the "hall of mirrors of strategic decision-making". His light-hearted excursion into the world of strategic calculation shows that even deep insights into the nature of strategic thought can be elucidated by games, puzzles, and diversions. Originally written in German and published by Vieweg-Verlag, this AMS edition is a translation tailored for the English-speaking reader. It offers an intriguing look at myths and paradoxes through the lens of game theory, bringing the mathematics into sharper focus at the same time. This book is a must for those who wish to consider game theory from a different perspective: one that embraces science, literature, and real-life conflict. The Game's Afoot! would make an excellent book for an undergraduate course in game theory. It can also be used for independent study or as supplementary course reading. The connections to literature, films and everyday life also make it highly suitable as a text for a challenging course for non-majors. Its refreshing style and amusing combination of game theoretic analysis and cultural issues even make it appealing as recreational reading.

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.
In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.