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Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 32

Авторы:
АБ В Г Д ЕЖЗ ИЙК Л М Н ОП РСТУФХЦЧ ШЩ ЭЮЯ
A B CD EF G H IJ K L M NO PQR S T UV W XYZ
 
Названия:
АБ ВГДЕЖЗИ ЙК ЛМ НО П Р СТ УФХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
A BCDE FG H IJKLM NOP QRS T UVWXYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 27-12-2006
Robert Gibbons
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, 288 с.
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2005
John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988, 396 с.
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well. By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality. The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 26-06-2006
John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten
Москва: Экономическая школа, 2001, cерия "Библиотека "Экономическая школа"", 424 с.
Книга представляет собой перевод на русский язык последней совместной монографии по теории игр известных авторов - Дж.Харшаньи и Р.Зельтена - нобелевских лауреатов в области экономики 1994 г. Она посвящена изложению единого подхода к выбору равновесия в конфликтных ситуациях, моделируемых в рамках теории игр. Не претендуя на абсолютную истину, авторы исследуют все основные проблемы теории игр, начиная с самого понятия игры, оптимального поведения в ней, свойств оптимального поведения, определения условий, при которых такое поведение осмыслено (проблемы существования единственности, а для динамических игр и временной состоятельности), и конструктивные методы нахождения оптимального поведения. Данная теория имеет многочисленные приложения в экономике, политике и других областях человеческой деятельности, связанных с анализом и разрешением конфликтов с применением математических методов.
Издание предназначено для широкого круга специалистов, студентов старших курсов, магистрантов и аспирантов экономических, математических и экономико-математических специальностей вузов, специализирующихся в областях прикладной математики, теории игр и применения математических методов в экономике и менеджменте.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Geoffrey A. Jehle, Philip John Reny
Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2001, cерия "Addison-Wesley series in economics", 543 с.
This rigorous, up-to-date text on modern microeconomic theory presents all of the core mathematics, neoclassical theory, game theory, and information economics needed to access the modern professional literature. Complex theory is patiently and carefully developed, then clearly explained and illustrated because even well-prepared students benefit from additional math help. Careful explanations, efficient theorem-proof organization, and many examples and exercises make this a uniquely effective text for advanced courses. Students will appreciate the clear writing and accessible style.
ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Auction Theory [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Vijay Krishna
San Diego: Academic Press, 2006, 200 с.
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry Richard Green
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1008 с.
Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard University, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005
Alexander Mehlmann
Providence: American Mathematical Society, 2000, 159 с.
It all started with von Neumann and Morgenstern half a century ago. Their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior gave birth to a whole new area of mathematics concerned with the formal problems of rational decision as experienced by multiple agents. Now, game theory is all around us, making its way even into regular conversations. In the present book, Mehlmann presents mathematical foundations and concepts illustrated via social quandaries, mock political battles, evolutionary confrontations, economic struggles, and literary conflict. Most of the standard models--the prisoners' dilemma, the arms race, evolution, duels, the game of chicken, etc.--are here. Many non-standard examples are also here: the Legend of Faust, shootouts in the movies, the Madness of Odysseus, to name a few. The author uses familiar formulas, fables, and paradoxes to guide readers through what he calls the "hall of mirrors of strategic decision-making". His light-hearted excursion into the world of strategic calculation shows that even deep insights into the nature of strategic thought can be elucidated by games, puzzles, and diversions. Originally written in German and published by Vieweg-Verlag, this AMS edition is a translation tailored for the English-speaking reader. It offers an intriguing look at myths and paradoxes through the lens of game theory, bringing the mathematics into sharper focus at the same time. This book is a must for those who wish to consider game theory from a different perspective: one that embraces science, literature, and real-life conflict. The Game's Afoot! would make an excellent book for an undergraduate course in game theory. It can also be used for independent study or as supplementary course reading. The connections to literature, films and everyday life also make it highly suitable as a text for a challenging course for non-majors. Its refreshing style and amusing combination of game theoretic analysis and cultural issues even make it appealing as recreational reading.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Paul Robert Milgrom
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, cерия "Churchill Lectures in Economics", 392 с.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005
Hervais Moulin
Москва: Мир, 1985, 200 с.
Книга французского математика, отражающая взаимосвязь между математической экономикой и теорией игр, в последние годы, на стыке этих двух наук получены интересные результаты. Изложение отличается методическими достоинствами - автор дает возможность читателю cамостоятельно разобраться в тщательно подобранных упражнениях. Для студентов и аспирантов, изучающих математическую экономику в теорию игр, а также для специалистов, работающих в этих областях.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Roger B. Myerson
Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1997, 584 с.
Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.
ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Martin J. Osborne
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 560 с.
Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences. Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioral sciences and more than 280 exercises. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used. Explaining the key concepts of game theory as simply as possible while maintaining complete precision, An Introduction to Game Theory is ideal for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in game theory.
ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006, 368 с.
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Теория игр [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-12-2006
Guillermo Owen
Москва: Едиториал УРСС, 2004, 216 с.
Предлагаемое издание представляет собой краткое и сравнительно элементарное учебное пособие, пригодное как для первоначального, так и для углубленного изучения теории игр. Для ее чтения достаточно знания элементов математического анализа и теории вероятностей. Работа делится на две части, первая из которых посвящена играм двух лиц, а вторая - играм n лиц. Она охватывает большинство направлений теории игр. В частности, рассмотрены антагонистические игры, игры двух лиц с ненулевой суммой и основы классической кооперативной теории. Каждая глава снабжена задачами разной степени сложности. Книга вполне доступна студентам и аспирантам университетов, технических и экономических высших учебных заведений. Она представляет интерес не только для математиков, но и для специалистов в области исследования операций, военного дела, теории управления и математической экономики.
ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Two-Sided Matching [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Alvin E. Roth, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, cерия "Econometric Society Monographs", 265 с.
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Fernando Vega-Redondo
Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 512 с.
This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information, and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions. The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between evolution and rationality.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)