Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 32
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Fernando Vega-Redondo
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 209 с.
The book covers the modern developments in Evolutionary Game Theory, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology, focusing on the core notions of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Replicator Dynamics. Both the static and dynamic approaches of this biological literature are presented in detail, and the general analysis illustrated with numerous examples. It then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. After a discussion of strictly deterministic dynamic models, stochastic perturbations are introduced in order to account for the social- and individual-based sources of ‘noise’ (including aggregate shocks, agents’ experimentation, and population renewal), which play an important role in evolutionary processes.Evolutionary Theory has become one of the leading approaches to understanding bounded rationality, learning, and change in complex social environments. The recent boom experienced by this discipline makes this book's systematic presentation of its fundamental contributions essential reading for any newcomer to the field. In addition, new avenues of research are suggested, and plentiful examples illustrate the theory's potential applications.
Evolutionary Game Theory [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Jorgen W. Weibull
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995, 287 с.
This text introduces current evolutionary game theory - where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet - emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.