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Новая политическая экономия (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 3

Книги

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все А Б ВГ Д Е Ж З ИЙК Л М Н ОП Р СТ УФХЦЧ Ш ЩЭЮЯ
A B C D EFG H IJKL M N O P QR S T UV W XYZ
 
Названия:
АБ В ГДЕЖ ЗИЙКЛМ НОП РСТ УФХЦЧШЩЭ ЮЯ
A BCD E FG HI JKLM NOP QRST UVWXYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2003
Eric A. Hanushek, Jeffrey S. Banks, Alberto Alesina, David P. Baron, Randall Calvert, A. John Ferejohn, Edward M. Gramlich, Raymond Riezman, William Riker, Pablo T. Spiller, David L. Weimer, John D. Wilson
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 283 с.
Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship, although its formal split into the distinct disciplines of political science and economics in the nineteenth century has limited the study of important social issues. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets. It brings together intellectual leaders from various areas, drawing on state-of-the-art theoretical and empirical analysis from each of the underlying disciplines. Each chapter, while beginning with a survey of existing work, focuses on profitable lines of inquiry for future developments. Particular attention is devoted to fields of active current development.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2003
Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, C. Susan Stokes, A. John Ferejohn, A. James Stimson, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Michael Laver, A. Kenneth Shepsle, John Dunn, D. Delmer Dunn
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 361 с.
This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development. The often surprising findings dispel any notion of a tradeoff between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2003
Federico Sturzenegger, Mariano Tommasi, Allan Drazen, Raquel Fernandez, Dani Rodrik, Alberto Alesina, Raúl Laban, Vittorio Grilli, Guillermo Mondino, Andres Velasco, Joshua Aizenman, Shang-Jin Wei, Gerard Roland, Mathias Dewatripont, César Martinelli, Ricardo López Murphy, Alex Cukierman
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998, 362 с.
In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and East European countries. They apply common standards of analytical rigor to the study of economic and political behavior, assuming political agents to be rational and forward-looking, with expectations consistent with the properties of the underlying model.

The book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take place? Second, how are reforms implemented? And third, which candidates are most likely to undertake reform? Although most of the chapters deal with policy issues in developing economies, the findings also apply to areas such as social security and health care reform in industrialized countries.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)