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Новая политическая экономия (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 5

Книги

Авторы:
А Б ВГ Д Е Ж З ИЙК Л М Н ОП Р СТ УФХЦЧ Ш ЩЭЮЯ
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Названия:
все АБ В ГДЕЖ ЗИЙКЛМ НОП РСТ УФХЦЧШЩЭ ЮЯ
A BCD E FG HI JKLM NOPQRST UVWXYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 30-12-2003
Paul R. Milgrom, John Donald Roberts, Harold Demsetz, Douglass C. North, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson
Ред.: A. Kenneth Shepsle, James E. Alt
Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 278 с.
This volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned. This new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions. More analytical than traditional approaches, it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real-world experience may be compared. Its focus is on empirical regularities, and its goal is theoretical explanation.

The field has focused on three main areas of research: models of collective action, constraints on competitive market processes, and the analysis of transaction costs. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. The first part of the volume surveys the field, while the second part displays positive political economy at work, examining a variety of subjects. The final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
Ред.: Dennis C. Mueller
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 688 с.
Общественный выбор или рациональная политика отличается от других подходов, изучающих политическое поведение тем, что оно основывается на моделях, в которых рациональные индивиды преследуют собственные интересы. В этом сборнике, состоящем из 5 частей, дается обзор основным идеям в этой области. Сборник содержит 25 работ 13 учёных, экономистами и политологами из Северной Америки и Европы. Авторы покрывают такие темы как природа и оправдание существования правительства, свойства различных правил голосования, электоральная политика в двух партийной системе и др.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 30-07-2004
Existing models of contagious currency crises are summarized and surveyed, and it is argued that more weight should be put on political factors. Towards this end, the concept of political contagion introduced, whereby contagion in speculative attacks across currencies arises solely because of political objectives of countries. A specific model of membership' contagion is presented. The desire to be part of a political-economic union, where maintaining a fixed exchange rate is a condition for membership and where the value of membership depends positively on who else is a member, is shown to give rise to potential contagion. We then present evidence suggesting that political contagion may have been important in the 1992-3 EMS crisis.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2003
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
Изд-во: MIT Press, 2000, cерия "Zeuthen Lectures", 551 с.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.

Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007
Allan Drazen
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000
This major text will have an enormous impact on students and professionals in political science as well as economics, redefining how decision makers on several continents think about the full range of macroeconomic issues and informing the approaches of the next generation of economists.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)