Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Torben Iversen
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, cерия "Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics", 336 с.
This book builds on new institutionalist theory in both economics and political science to offer a general political economy framework for the study of welfare capitalism. Based on the key idea that social protection in a modern economy, both inside and outside the state, can be understood as protection of specific investments in human capital, the book offers a systematic explanation of popular preferences for redistributive spending, the economic role of political parties and electoral systems, and labor market stratification (including gender inequality). Contrary to the popular idea that competition in the global economy undermines international differences in the level of social protection, the book argues that these differences are made possible by a high international division of labor. Such a division is what allows firms to specialize in production that requires an abundant supply of workers with specific skills, and hence high demand for protection.
Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-12-2005Torben Iversen
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, cерия "Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics", 221 с.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.