Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2
Fear of Floating [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-08-2007Guillermo A. Calvo, Carmen M. Reinhart
In recent years, many countries have suffered severe financial crises, producing a staggering toll on their economies, particularly in emerging markets. One view blames fixed exchange rates-- soft pegs'--for these meltdowns. Adherents to that view advise countries to allow their currency to float. Authors analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, the monetary aggregates, interest rates, and commodity prices across 154 exchange rate arrangements to assess whether official labels' provide an adequate representation of actual country practice. Authors find that, countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not--there seems to be an epidemic case of fear of floating.' Since countries that are classified as having a free or a managed float mostly resemble noncredible pegs--the so-called demise of fixed exchange rates' is a myth--the fear of floating is pervasive, even among some of the developed countries. Paper presents an analytical framework that helps to understand why there is fear of floating.
Chang R. Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime [Текст] / R. Chang, A. Velasco. Cambridge : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998. 37 p. (NBER working paper series ; 6469). [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-07-2004
Authors study financial fragility, exchange rate crises and monetary policy in an open economy model in which banks are maturity transformers as in Diamond-Dybvig. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks become possible. Authors compare currency boards, fixed rate and flexible rates, with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot implement a socially optimal allocation; in addition, under a currency board bank runs are possible. A fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board. Larger capital inflows enhance welfare if the no-run equilibrium occurs, but may also render the economy more vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs. A flexible exchange rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs, provided the exchange rate and central bank lending policies of the central bank are appropriately designed.