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Международная экономика является комплексной дисциплиной, изучающей взаимодействие экономических агентов разных стран. Традиционно экономическая дисциплина «Международная экономика» делится на 2 части: международная торговля и международные финансы, однако в раздел науки «Международная экономика» включают также международный бизнес, международные экономические отношения, международная политическая экономия и др. смежные дисциплины. (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2

Книги

Авторы:
все АБ ВГДЕЖЗИЙК ЛМНОПРС ТУФ ХЦЧШЩЭЮЯ
ABC D E F GH I J KLM NOPQR S TU V WXYZ
 
Названия:
АБВГ ДЕЖЗИЙКЛМНОП РСТУФХЦЧ ШЩЭЮЯ
A BC DEF G HI JKLM N O P QR ST UVW XYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 27-04-2004
G. Andrew Karolyi, Rene M. Stulz
2002
Authors review the international finance literature to assess the extent to which international factors affect financial asset demands and prices. International asset pricing models with mean-variance investors predict that an asset's risk premium depends on its covariance with the world market portfolio and, possibly, with exchange rate changes. The existing empirical evidence shows that a country's risk premium depends on its covariance with the world market portfolio and that there is some evidence that exchange rate risk affects expected returns. However, the theoretical asset pricing literature relying on mean-variance optimizing investors fails in explaining the portfolio holdings of investors, equity flows, and the time-varying properties of correlations across countries. The home bias has the effect of increasing local influences on asset prices, while equity flows and cross-country correlations increase global influences on asset prices.
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Odious Debt [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran
2003
Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans.