Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 1028
Опубликовано на портале: 02-12-2008Gerald F. Davis, Christopher Marquis Российский журнал менеджмента. 2007. Т. 5. № 4. С. 67-90.
В статье утверждается, что в конце 1980-х гг. в рамках теории организации произошел сдвиг от парадигмо-ориентированных (paradigm-driven) к проблемно-ориентированным исследованиям (problem-driven work). В середине 1970-х гг. было разработано множество парадигм изучения организаций, включая теорию трансакционных издержек (transaction cost economics), концепцию ресурсной зависимости (resource dependence theory), организационную экологию (organizational ecology), новую институциональную теорию (new institutional theory) и агентскую теорию (agency theory) в финансовой экономике. Эти подходы отражали ключевые тенденции развития крупных корпораций того периода: возрастающую концентрацию, диверсификацию и бюрократизацию. Тем не менее последующие изменения организационных границ, растущая популярность альянсов и сетевых форм организации и усиливающееся влияние финансовых рынков на процесс принятия организационных решений привели к тому, что плодотворность традиционных научных методов для решения вопросов, вытекающих из перечисленных парадигм, снизилась. Мы полагаем, что в условиях происходящих в настоящее время масштабных экономических изменений наиболее адекватны исследования конкретных проблем с использованием теории механизмов (mechanism-based theorizing), рассматривающие в качестве единицы анализа не организацию (organization), а поле (field). Наилучшими примерами таких работ являются разнообразные исследования в рамках институциональной теории, проведенные в течение последних 15 лет, некоторые из которых рассмотрены в статье.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-12-2008Gareth Morgan Российский журнал менеджмента. 2007. Т. 5. № 4. С. 47-66.
Цель данной работы — представить элементы радикально-гуманистической критики, предполагающей, что такая дисциплина, как теория организации, оказалась заложницей собственных метафор, а также попытаться понять, как она может начать освобождаться из этого плена. В работе изучается взаимосвязь между парадигмами, метафорами и решением задач, что позволяет увидеть, как теория организации и исследования в этой области выстраиваются на основе переплетения принимаемых на веру предположений. Рассматриваются метафорическая природа теории и значение метафор в построении теории. Приводятся аргументы в пользу теоретического и методологического плюрализма, что сделает возможным развитие новых подходов к анализу организаций. Хотя ортодоксальный подход основан лишь на нескольких метафорах в рамках функциональной парадигмы, можно продемонстрировать потенциальную плодотворность метафор из других парадигм, которые оспаривают основные допущения ортодоксального подхода.
How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2006. No. 06/2 .
This essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms(CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, define and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are characterized by distinct institutional configurations that generate a particular systemic logic of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institutional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in developing a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of politics and power.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Socio-Economic Review. 2007. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 149-179.
In this paper we analyse the comparative capitalisms literature, which encompasses several analytical frameworks, but shares common concerns in understanding the institutional foundations of diverse national ‘varieties’ of capitalism. One widespread weakness within this literature has been its static analysis and bias toward predicting institutional stability rather than change. Our contention is that introducing more dynamism into this literature must proceed on three distinct levels: the micro, meso and macro. On the micro level, it needs to develop a less deterministic view of institutions that incorporates a stronger understanding of how actors reshape institutions, not only as constraints on particular courses of action, but also as resources for new courses of action that (incrementally) transform those institutions. On the meso-level, it needs to specify more carefully the linkages among institutions and institutional domains and theorize how change in one affects change in the other. At the macro level, it needs to incorporate a compelling view of national and international politics that draws upon a theory of coalitional dynamics and the impact of particular rule-making processes that governs institutional reform in each nation.
Understanding an emergent diversity of corporate governance and organizational architecture: an essentiality-based analysis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson Industrial and Corporate Change. 2008. Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 1-27.
This article proposes a simple framework for understanding an emergent diversity of linkages between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers human assets (MHA), workers human assets (WHA), and non-human assets (NHA). Using the concept of essentiality of human assets proposed by Hart (1995) and distinguished from that of complementarities, we first propose a new characterization of four known modes of CG-OA linkage: three traditional (Anglo-American, German, and Japanese) and one relatively new (Silicon Valley) models. Then we present empirical evidences of emergent diversity of CG-OA linkages in Japan, which is somewhat at odds with the old Japanese model. We interpret its emergent dominant mode as the path-dependent evolution of a new pattern of essentiality between human assets, made viable by lessening of institutional-complementarity-constraints, which surrounded the traditional Japanese model. We argue that this new mode interpreted in terms of essentiality may have broader applicability beyond Japanese context.
Comparing capitalisms: understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Journal Of International Business Studies. 2008. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 540-561.
This paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business (IB) studies. Within IB, institutions matter, but the view of institutions tends to be "thin", utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description, and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional ''variables" that impact on particular facets of business activity. This paper argues that IB research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity. A number of alternative case-based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing "comparative capitalisms" literature in sociology and political science. The paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for IB scholars.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson
Ред.: Masahiko Aoki, Hideaki Miyajima
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 0199284512, 416 с.
This book uses comparative institutional analysis to explain differences in national economic performance. Countries have their own rules for corporate governance and they have different market arrangements; and these differences in rules and organization affect the way firms behave. Countries also tend to develop conventions of organizational architechture of firms, whether their hierarchies are functional, horizontal, or decentralized. This affects the way in which they process information, and information management is increasingly seen as being of crucial importance to a firm's performance. Aoki accords more importance to these factors than to the factors conventionally used in applying a neoclassical model of economic efficiency. He applies game theory, contract theory, and information theory. By describing the rules and norms in Japan, the USA, and the transitional economies, Aoki shows how firms can achieve competitive advantage in international markets if these conventions and rules are well suited to the industrial sector in which the firms operate. He is particularly concerned with how Japan, with its main bank and lifelong employment systems, as well as information-sharing firm organizational structure, might reform its institutions to maintain competitive advantage in the world economy.
Can High-technology Industries Prosper in Germany? Institutional Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology Industries [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer, David Soskice Industry and Innovation. 2008. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 5 - 24.
The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 2. P. 453-517 .
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
State versus private ownership [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1998. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 133-150.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Timothy Frye, Andrei Shleifer American Economic Review. 2007. Vol. 87. No. 2. P. 354-358.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
A survey of corporate governance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783.
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150.
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon Journal of Financial Economics. 2002. Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 3-27 .
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) "crime and punishment" framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008American Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 94. No. 2. P. 414-418 .
Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 .
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008C. B. Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2005. Vol. 120. No. 4. P. 1445-1473.
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower.
What works in securities laws? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2006. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 1-32 .
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.