Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts
Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 1043

Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg Journal Of International Business Studies. 2008.  Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 540-561. 
This paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business (IB) studies. Within IB, institutions matter, but the view of institutions tends to be "thin", utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description, and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional ''variables" that impact on particular facets of business activity. This paper argues that IB research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity. A number of alternative case-based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing "comparative capitalisms" literature in sociology and political science. The paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for IB scholars.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
Ред.: Masahiko Aoki, Hideaki Miyajima
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 0199284512, 416 с.
This book uses comparative institutional analysis to explain differences in national economic performance. Countries have their own rules for corporate governance and they have different market arrangements; and these differences in rules and organization affect the way firms behave. Countries also tend to develop conventions of organizational architechture of firms, whether their hierarchies are functional, horizontal, or decentralized. This affects the way in which they process information, and information management is increasingly seen as being of crucial importance to a firm's performance. Aoki accords more importance to these factors than to the factors conventionally used in applying a neoclassical model of economic efficiency. He applies game theory, contract theory, and information theory. By describing the rules and norms in Japan, the USA, and the transitional economies, Aoki shows how firms can achieve competitive advantage in international markets if these conventions and rules are well suited to the industrial sector in which the firms operate. He is particularly concerned with how Japan, with its main bank and lifelong employment systems, as well as information-sharing firm organizational structure, might reform its institutions to maintain competitive advantage in the world economy.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer, David Soskice Industry and Innovation. 2008.  Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 5 - 24. 
The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Courts [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003.  Vol. 118. No. 2. P. 453-517 . 
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1998.  Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 133-150. 

ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Timothy Frye, Andrei Shleifer American Economic Review. 2007.  Vol. 87. No. 2. P. 354-358. 

ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Corruption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997.  Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783. 
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997.  Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150. 
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 3-27 . 
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) "crime and punishment" framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
American Economic Review. 2004.  Vol. 94. No. 2. P. 414-418 . 

ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003.  Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 . 
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
C. B. Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2005.  Vol. 120. No. 4. P. 1445-1473. 
We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2006.  Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 1-32 . 
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer European Financial Management. 2005.  Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 439-451. 

ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Political Economy. 2007.  Vol. 115. No. 1. P. 43-68. 
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2007.  Vol. 84. No. 2. P. 299-329 . 
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and informationsharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Giacomo A. M Ponzetto, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2007.  Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 77-99. 
Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer, Daniel S. Treisman
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000, 233 с.
Recent commentators on Russia's economic reforms have almost uniformly declared them a disappointing and avoidable—failure. In this book, two American scholars take a new and more balanced look at the country's attempts to build capitalism on the ruins of Soviet central planning. They show how and why the Russian reforms achieved remarkable breakthroughs in some areas but came undone in others. Unlike Eastern European countries such as Poland or the Czech Republic, to which it is often compared, Russia is a federal, ethnically diverse, industrial giant with an economy heavily oriented toward raw materials extraction. The political obstacles it faced in designing reforms were incomparably greater. Shleifer and Treisman tell how Russia's leaders, navigating in uncharted economic terrain, managed to find a path around some of these obstacles. In successful episodes, central reformers devised a strategy to win over some key opponents, while dividing and marginalizing others. Such political tactics made possible the rapid privatization of 14,000 state enterprises in 1992-1994 and the defeat of inflation in 1995. But failure to outmaneuver the new oligarchs and regional governors after 1996 undermined reformers' attempts to collect taxes and clean up the bureaucracy that has stifled business growth. Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. Written in an accessible style, the book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 218 с.
Russia's historic transition from communism in the 1990s sparked intense, often ideological debates. This book offers a firsthand glimpse into the intellectual challenges that Russia's turbulent transition generated. It deals with many of the most important reforms, from Gorbachev's half-hearted "perestroika," to the mass privatization program, to the efforts to build legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy. The essays in this book attempt to identify the driving forces of Russia's rapidly changing economic and social reality. To understand Yeltsin's reforms, the book argues, it is essential to grasp their twin goals of destroying the remnants of the communist order and building the institutions of a market economy. Time after time, reforms were shaped to assure that communism, with its overwhelming control of the economy and society, the planning ministries, and pervasive centralization, cannot come back to Russia. Many of the successes, as well as the pathologies, of the Russian economy during the 1990s must be understood from this perspective. Despite many setbacks, Yeltsin succeeded in his life's mission. By the end of the twentieth century, both a market economy and a democracy were developed in Russia. Each was both vulnerable and flawed, but the escape from communism was certain. A decade after communism, Russia became a normal country.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит графическое изображение (иллюстрацию)