Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 1044
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Andrei Shleifer
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 218 с.
Russia's historic transition from communism in the 1990s sparked intense, often ideological debates. This book offers a firsthand glimpse into the intellectual challenges that Russia's turbulent transition generated. It deals with many of the most important reforms, from Gorbachev's half-hearted "perestroika," to the mass privatization program, to the efforts to build legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy. The essays in this book attempt to identify the driving forces of Russia's rapidly changing economic and social reality. To understand Yeltsin's reforms, the book argues, it is essential to grasp their twin goals of destroying the remnants of the communist order and building the institutions of a market economy. Time after time, reforms were shaped to assure that communism, with its overwhelming control of the economy and society, the planning ministries, and pervasive centralization, cannot come back to Russia. Many of the successes, as well as the pathologies, of the Russian economy during the 1990s must be understood from this perspective. Despite many setbacks, Yeltsin succeeded in his life's mission. By the end of the twentieth century, both a market economy and a democracy were developed in Russia. Each was both vulnerable and flawed, but the escape from communism was certain. A decade after communism, Russia became a normal country.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998, 288 с.
In many countries, public sector institutions impose heavy burdens on economic life: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich corrupt bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. As a consequence of such predatory policies--described in this book as the grabbing hand of the state--entrepreneurship lingers and economies stagnate. The authors of this collection of essays describe many of these pathologies of a grabbing hand government, and examine their consequences for growth. The essays share a common viewpoint that political control of economic life is central to the many government failures that we observe. Fortunately, a correct diagnosis suggests the cures, including the best strategies of fighting corruption, privatization of state firms, and institutional building in the former socialist economies. Depoliticization of economic life emerges as the crucial theme of the appropriate reforms. The book describes the experiences with the grabbing hand government and its reform in medieval Europe, developing countries, transition economies, as well as today's United States.
Privatizing Russia [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, Maksim Boycko
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995, 175 с.
Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program —corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions—are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms
Government ownership of banks [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
The regulation of entry [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 117. No. 1. P. 1-37 .
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
The quality of government [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal Of Law, Economics & Organization. 1999. Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 222-279.
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
The Regulation of Labor [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004. Vol. 119. No. 4. P. p1339-1382.
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008. Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465..
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Law and Finance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1998. Vol. 106. No. 6. P. 1113-1155.
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000. Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27.
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Literature. 2008. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 285-332.
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
The New Comparative Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003. Vol. 31. No. 4. P. 595-619.
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Лоббизм как деловой инструментарий [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2008Александр Викторович Летенко Российский журнал менеджмента. 2006. Т. 4. № 2. С. 155-158.
Рецензия на книгу: Берлин А. Д., Григор Г. Э. Корпоративный лоббизм: Теория и практика. М.: Издат. дом Междунар. ун&та в Москве, 2005. 200 с.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2008Наталья Петровна Дроздова Российский журнал менеджмента. 2006. Т. 4. № 2. С. 145-154.
Рецензия на книги: Кузьминов Я. И., Бендукидзе К. А., Юдкевич М. М. Курс институциональной экономики: институты, сети, трансакционные издержки, контракты: Учебник для вузов. М.: Изд. дом ГУ–ВШЭ, 2006. XL, 442,  с. Аузан А. А. (ред.). Институциональная экономика: новая институциональная экономическая теория: Учебник (Учебники экономического факультета МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова). М.: ИНФРА;М, 2005. 416 с.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2008Виталий Леонидович Тамбовцев Российский журнал менеджмента. 2006. Т. 4. № 1. С. 123-130.
В публикации содержится отзыв на статью Рудольфа Рихтера, опубликованную в этом же номере журнала. С точки зрения В.Л. Тамбовцева, кроме того, что работа Рихтера восполняет значительный пробел в представлениях о современном состоянии новой институциональной экономической теории (НИЭТ), ее ценность особенно велика потому, что она представляет собой во многом «взгляд изнутри» — со стороны неотстраненного наблюдателя, а практикующего исследователя, активно работающего в рамках новой институциональной экономической теории.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2008Георгий Борисович Клейнер Российский журнал менеджмента. 2006. Т. 4. № 1. С. 113-122.
Поводом к рассуждениям Г.Б. Клейнера о развитии «новой институциональной экономической теории» (НИЭТ) в качестве самостоятельного направления исследований послужил выход русского перевода известной книги Э. Г. Фуруботна и Р. Рихтера «Институты и экономическая теория. Достижения новой институциональной экономической теории» под редакцией В. С. Катькало и Н. П. Дроздовой [Фуруботн, Рихтер, 2005]. Следуя за Э. Г. Фуруботном и Р. Рихтером и несколько агрегируя предложенный ими перечень основополагающих концепций НИЭТ, автор статьи формулирует базисные посылки НИЭТ в виде перечня из четырех пунктов: двух «новаций» — положений, введенных или существенно развитых в новой институциональной экономической теории, и двух «консерваций» — положений, заимствованных из других теорий.
История бизнеса как путь познания [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2008Юрий Евгеньевич Благов Российский журнал менеджмента. 2005. Т. 3. № 4. С. 169-177.
Рецензия на книгу: Chandler Alfred D., Jr. Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries. The Free Press, 2001