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Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 1051

Property Rights [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Armen A. Alchian Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. 2002. 
One of the most fundamental requirements of a capitalist economic systemand one of the most misunderstood conceptsis a strong system of property rights. The definition, allocation, and protection of property rights is one of the most complex and difficult set of issues that any society has to resolve, but it is one that must be resolved in some fashion. In this essay different aspects of private property rights system discuss.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Margit Osterloh, Bruno S. Frey University of Zurich, Working Paper Series. 1999.  No. 27.
Employees are motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Intrinsic motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must be transferred. Organizational forms enable different kinds of motivation and have different capacities to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. Since knowledge generation and transfer are essential for a firms sustainable competitive advantage, authors ask specifically what kinds of motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit knowledge.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Steven Shavell, Tanguy Ypersele NBER Working Paper Series. 1999.  No. 6956.
This paper compares reward system to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information requires for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward system, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Francesco Parisi Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
Modern legal systems generally recognize customary rules that have emerged either within the confines of positive legislation or in areas that are not disciplined by positive law. Where custom is in direct conflict with legislation the latter normally prevails. In some instances, however, a custom supersedes prior legislation (that is, abrogative custom), and some arguments have been made in support of emerging practices that conflict with obsolete provisions of public international law. The theoretical and practical significance of some forms of spontaneous social order, which compete with enacted law in influencing human choice, are discussed below.
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The Theory of the Firm [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando, Steen Thomsen Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. Foss, Lando and Thomsen categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrшm and Milgroms theory of the firm as an incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon) as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy). Authors argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems to be emerging.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Louis Kaplow Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses two fundamental characteristics of rules. The first concerns the degree of precision, detail, or complexity they embody: how finely are different sorts of behavior to be distinguished? A second aspect of legal commands concerns when a given level of detail is provided - at the time of promulgation (rules) or subsequent to individuals actions, in the context of adjudication (standards). These aspects of rules are considered from a perspective that focuses upon information costs and dissemination: different sorts of legal commands involve differing costs of formulation and application by private parties (deciding upon their own conduct) and adjudicators, and the character of laws also influences how well parties actually will understand the law and conform their conduct accordingly. The discussion encompasses related questions involving the role of precedent, the evolution of the law over time, legal uncertainty and accuracy in adjudication. This chapter also addresses the separate problem of how changes in legal rules should apply to prior behavior or preexisting investments - issues of retroactivity and transition.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Gerald Friedman PERI Working paper series. 2001.  No. 14.
Society makes property. Economic systems are defined by what they allow to become property, and the extent of property varies enormously. Some allow property claims to fixed objects, such as land and trees, sometimes including the ephemeral, such as wildlife or flowing water. Some extend property to include ideas (patents); a few include human beings themselves as chattel slaves. Societies also differ in the intensive rights they accord property holders, the bundle of state enforced privileges attaching responsibility for the impact actions have on others. Intensive rights prevent us from assessing law as involving more or less protection to property because each use of property affects the property of others. Property has intensive dimensions because it involves reciprocal relationships among people; my intensive right to use property diminishes your right to be free of intrusion. This makes property law distributional. Few dispute that property law has important effects on income distribution, but some choose to emphasize arguments over efficiency.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss DRUID Working Paper. 2002.  No. 02-04.
The role of transaction cost economics in developing research in strategy has been a hotly debated topic over the last decade. This paper presents the radical argument that transaction cost insights are more than merely useful complements to existing approaches to strategy. Rather, they are necessary for adequately understanding the nature of strategizing. This is because transaction costs are essential aspects of processes of creating, capturing and protecting value. If transaction costs are zero, these processes do not pose any strategic problems; strategizing is trivialized in such a world. When transaction costs are positive, on the other hand, opportunities for value creation through the reduction of inefficiencies caused by transaction costs exist, and protecting and appropriating value are costly activities that dissipate value. Also, contracting and expectations enter as central aspects of strategizing. Arguments are provided for why economizing (with transaction costs) is more fundamental than strategizing (in the sense of exploiting market power). Thus, the paper argues that models in which the fullest possible account of transaction costs is made be used as the proper foundations and benchmarks for economics-based strategy research, rather than the patched-up competitive equilibrium models that are now used, more or less implicitly, as the benchmark in important parts of strategy research, most notably in the resource-based view.
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Transaction Costs [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglas W. Allen Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses the history, use and significance of the term transaction costs. Few words in the economic language have been more abused or fought over and this is shown to result from the emergence of two distinct definitions and uses. The Neoclassical definition rests on the costs of trading across a market, while the property rights definition centers on the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights. In articulating these two separate definitions and in demonstrating their relationship and separate uses, it is hoped that more progress can be made in the field of transaction cost economics.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglass C. North Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 1994. 
An economic definition of transaction costs is the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. In the larger context of societal evolution they are all the costs involved in human interaction over time. It is this larger context that North explores in this essay. The concept is a close kin to the notion of social capital advanced by James Coleman (1990) and applied imaginatively to studying the differential patterns of Italian regional development by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work (1993). This essay, therefore, is a study in economic history which focuses on the costs of human coordination and cooperation through time which I regard as the key dilemma of societies past, present and future.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Edwin G. Westi Carleton Economic Papers. 2002.  No. 01-01.
This paper is designed to acquaint the reader with the historical background of the concept of property rights and several surrounding controversies by reviewing early work on property by economists and philosophers (with the main emphasis on the former). The survey focuses on significant contributions from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, setting the stage for the following chapters that reflect more recent thinking.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Oliver Hart NBER Working Paper Series. 2001.  No. 8286.
This paper discusses some of the attempts economists have made in the last ten years or so to integrate norms into the theory of the firm. The paper argues that (a) although norms are undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future; (b) so far norms have not added a great deal to our understanding of such issues as the determinants of firm boundaries (the make-or-buy decision) that is, at this point a norm-free of the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm dont seem to have very different predictions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss, Kirsten Foss Copenhagen Business School Working Paper. 2002.  No. 02.
This paper develops a property rights-based view of strategy (the PRV). A property right (or economic right) is an individuals net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of an asset (including, e.g., a monopoly position) or consume it indirectly through exchange. Resources expended on exchanging, protecting and capturing such rights are transaction costs, so that we directly link property rights, transaction costs, and economic value. Authors assume that all relevant exchange is costly and that all agents maximize their property rights. They argue that economizing with transaction costs become a distinct source of value, and potentially of sustained competitive advantage in such a setting. Strategizing revolves around influencing impediments (i.e., transaction costs) to value creation. Expectations and contracting also become crucial parts of processes of creating, protecting and capturing value. They use these insights to derive a number of refutable propositions, and argue that key insights from both industrial organization economics and the resource-based view are consistent with the PRV.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Herschel I. Grossman NBER Working Paper Series. 2000.  No. 7897.
Traditionally, general-equilibrium models have taken effective property rights to be given and have been concerned only with analyzing the allocation of resources among productive uses and the distribution of the resulting product. But, this formulation of the economic problem is incomplete because it neglects that the appropriative activities by which people create the effective property rights that inform allocation and distribution are themselves an alternative use of scare resources. This paper develops two canonical general-equilibrium models of resource allocation and income distribution that allow for the allocation of time and effort to the creation of effective property rights to valuable resources. In one model the valuable resources are initially in common pool. In the other models the analysis reveals how the amount of time and effort that agents allocate to the creation of effective property rights, on the technology of production, and on the scale of the economy. The paper also analyses the security of initial claims to valuable resources and speculates about why initial claims are perfectly secure.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Andrew Hoffman, Marc Ventresca
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002
Brings together emerging perspectives from organization theory and management, environmental sociology, international regime studies, and the social studies of science and technology to provide a starting point for discipline-based studies of environmental policy and corporate environmental behavior.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Andrew Hoffman
San Francisco: New Lexington Press, 1997
From denouncing Silent Spring to embracing strategic environmentalism, Andrew Hoffman engagingly traces this evolution. Using institutional theory to interpret his original research into the actions of companies, Hoffman documents the radical shift that has occurred and analyzes the impact of external social, political, and market forces.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Bertin Martens, Peter Murrell, Uwe Mummert, Paul Seabright
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002
This book analyzes the institutions--incentives and constraints--that guide the behavior of persons involved in the implementation of aid programs. While traditional performance studies tend to focus almost exclusively on policies and institutions in recipient countries, the authors look at incentives in the entire chain of organizations involved in the delivery of foreign aid, from donor governments and agencies to consultants, experts and other intermediaries. They examine incentives inside donor agencies, the interaction of subcontractors with recipient organizations, incentives inside recipient country institutions, and biases in aid performance monitoring systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2003
Philip Klein
Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1994
Some 18 essays by American institutional economist Klein (Pennsylvania State U.), written over the last two decades, are grouped under five major heads: institutionalism - a basic perspective; institutionalism and concentrated power; the role of the public sector; applied institutional economics; and the obligation of the economist.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2003
Chrysostomos Mantzavinos
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001
A text integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology to offer a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets work within those institutions. Proposes a unifying problem-solving model of individual behavior.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2003
Ines MacHo-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001
A textbook on optimal contract theory, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals or organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship.
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