Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2071
Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-07-2007
Lars A. Stole
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
2007.
Vol. 4.
No. 4.
P. 529-562.
We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in
an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the
nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type
of private inflation the customer possesses - either horizontal uncertainty regarding
brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that
as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as
price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price
discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging
greater entry.
Industrial Organization: Econ 8601 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-07-2007
Thomas J. Holmes
Fall, 2006
Econ 8601 is the first of the three-course graduate field sequence in industrial
organization. The course requirements include a final exam and several homework
sets
Опубликовано на портале: 15-07-2007
Glenn Ellison, Edward Ludwig Glaeser
Journal of Political Economy.
1997.
Vol. 105.
No. 5.
P. 889-927.
This paper discusses the prevalence of Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual
manufacturing industries in the United States. A model in which localized industry-specific
spillovers, natural advantages, and random chance contribute to geographic concentration
motivates new indices of geographic concentration and coagglomeration. The indices
contain controls that facilitate cross-industry and cross-country comparisons. The
authors find almost all industries to be more concentrated than a random dart-throwing
model predicts but the degree of localization is often slight. They also discuss
which industries are concentrated, the geographic scope of localization, coagglomeration
patterns, and other topics.
A Reprise of Size and R&D [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Wesley Marc Cohen, Steven Klepper
Economic Journal.
1996.
Vol. 106.
No. 437.
P. 925-951.
Numerous studies have shown that, within industries, the propensity to perform R&D
and the amount of R&D conducted by performers are closely related to the size of
the firm, while R&D productivity declines with firm size. These findings have been
widely interpreted to indicate that there is no advantage to large firm size in conducting
R&D. The authors show how a simple model based on the idea of R&D cost spreading
can explain the prior findings about the R&D-firm size relationship, as well as additional
features of the R&D-firm size relationship, implying an advantage to large size in
R&D.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Steven Klepper
RAND Journal of Economics.
2002.
Vol. 33.
No. 1.
P. 37-61.
After their commercial introduction, the number of producers of autos, tires, televisions,
and penicillin initially grew and then experienced a sharp decline or shakeout. Guided
by an evolutionary model of entry and exit, firm survival patterns in the four products
are examined to determine whether there were common forces governing their distinctive
evolution. Predictions concerning the effects of pre- and post-entry experience and
the timing of entry on firm survival are tested. The findings are used to reflect
on why industries experience shakeouts and evolve to be oligopolies.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Kathryn L. Shaw, Francine Lafontaine
Journal of Political Economy.
2007.
Vol. 107.
No. 5.
P. 1041-1080.
This paper provides the first systematic evidence on how franchisors adjust their
royalty rates and franchise fees as they gain franchising experience. This evidence
comes from a unique panel data set that we assembled on these monetary contract terms
for about 1,000 franchisors each year for the 1980-92 period.
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro
RAND Journal of Economics.
1990.
Vol. 21.
No. 1.
P. 106-112.
In providing rewards to innovators, there is a tradeoff between patent length and
breadth. This article provides conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves
infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward
for innovation.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Drew Fudenberg, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jean Tirole
European Economic Review.
1983.
Vol. 22.
No. 1.
P. 3-31.
This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition
and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Under some conditions, a firm with
an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘ε-preemption’
is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured
by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition
and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates
how ε-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D
process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges
in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms'
R&D investment activities.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
A. Colin Cameron, Severin Borenstein, Richard J. Gilbert
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1997.
Vol. 112.
No. 1.
P. 305-39.
The authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to
increases than to decreases in crude oil prices. Among the possible sources of this
asymmetry are production/inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers.
By analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain, the
authors attempt to shed light on these theories. Spot prices for generic gasoline
show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes, which may reflect inventory
adjustment effects. Asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale
price changes, possibly indicating short-run market power among retailers.
Естественная монополия [словарная статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 09-07-2007
Игорь Николаевич Баранов
Фирма, средние затраты длительного периода которой снижаются на всем диапазоне спроса
вследствие возрастающей отдачи от масштаба, является естественной монополией .
Таким образом, одна фирма может удовлетворить весь рыночный спрос на товар с меньшими
средними затратами, чем те, которые были бы возможны, если бы две или несколько конкурирующих
фирм поставляли точно такое же количество товара.
Graduate Industrial Organization: Economics 351 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007
Patrick L. Bajari
Spring, 2007
This is a course intended for Ph.D. students interested in conducting research
in empirical microeconomics.
Industrial Organization and Public Policy: 14.20 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007
Nancy L. Rose
Spring, 2003
This is an undergraduate course in industrial organization, the study of firms in
markets. Industrial
organization focuses on firm behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, which appear
to be far more common than the perfectly competitive markets that were the focus
of your basic microeconomics course. This field analyzes the acquisition and use
of market power by firms, strategic interactions among firms, and the role of government
competition policy. We will approach this subject from both theoretical and applied
perspectives.
Industrial Organization I [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007
Michael H. Riordan
Fall, 2002
This Ph.D. course provides an overview of selected topics in industrial organization
(IO) economics. Its goal is to survey the main outlines of modern IO, to develop
key theoretical ideas, to demonstrate important techniques, to link theory to empirical
work, and to relate theoretical and empirical results to policy issues. The course
emphasizes theoretical IO, as the empirical side of the field is covered in depth
in Industrial Organization II offered in the spring.
Theoretical Industrial Organization: Econ 271A [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007
John G. Riley
Fall 2006
Elective Doctoral Field course. Topics to be covered in this course will include
(1) monopoly and price discrimination;
(2) dynamic price competition and tacit collusion; (3) theory of the firm; (4) signaling
and limit pricing; (9) auctions and bidding.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
Steven Klepper
American Economic Review.
1996.
Vol. 86.
No. 3.
P. 562-83.
Regularities concerning how entry, exit, market structure, and innovation vary from
the birth of technologically progressive industries through maturity are summarized.
A model emphasizing differences in firm innovative capabilities and the importance
of firm size in appropriating the returns from innovation is developed to explain
the regularities. The model also explains regularities regarding the relationship
within industries between firm size and firm innovative effort, innovative productivity,
cost, and profitability. It predicts that over time firms devote more effort to process
innovation but the number of firms and the rate and diversity of product innovation
eventually wither.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
Journal of Economic Perspectives.
2001.
Vol. 15.
No. 2.
P. 25-441.
We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects
and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new
operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the
Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions
to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's
conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's
proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that
a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
Richard J. Gilbert, David M.G. Newbery
American Economic Review.
1982.
Vol. 72.
No. 3.
P. 514-26.
This article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the
patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their
monopoly power. The results apply to other situations such as brand identification,
spatial location, and capacity expansion, which share the characteristic that early,
or preemptive, actions may lower the returns to potential competitors.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
David M.G. Newbery
RAND Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 726-749.
The supply function model of the English electricity spot market is extended to include
a contract market and contestable entry, both of which have dramatic effects on the
determination of equilibrium. I present an analytically tractable model that can
be solved with contracts, variable numbers of competitors, and capacity constraints.
In the case of constant marginal costs and linear demand, two outcomes are possible:
if new plant is the same as existing plant and incumbents have insufficient capacity,
entry will occur, but if new plant has lower variable costs then incumbents can invest
to deter entry.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
Richard Charles Levin, Wesley Marc Cohen
New York: North-Holland, 1989, cерия "Handbooks in Economics", 2, 986 с.
A central theme of this survey is to emphasize the already perceptible
movement of empirical scholars from a narrow concern with the role of firm size
and market concentration toward a broader consideration of the fundamental
determinants of technical change in industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007
Richard Charles Levin, Peter C. Reiss
RAND Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 19.
No. 4.
P. 538-556.
This article analyzes R&D policies when the returns to cost-reducing and demand-creating
R&D are imperfectly appropriable and market structure is endogenous. We generalize
previous characterizations of appropriability to permit the possibility that own
and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes. We also describe how equilibrium expenditures
on process and product R&D, as well as equilibrium market structure, depend on technological
opportunities and spillovers. In contrast to previous work, diminished appropriability
does not necessarily reduce R&D expenditures. For example, under some conditions,
an increase in the extent of process (product) spillovers will lead to an increase
in product (process) R&D. We estimate several variants of the model by using manufacturing
line-of-business data and data from a survey of R&D executives.
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