Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2070
Industrial Organization: Econ 8601 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-07-2007Thomas J. Holmes
Econ 8601 is the first of the three-course graduate field sequence in industrial organization. The course requirements include a final exam and several homework sets
Опубликовано на портале: 15-07-2007Glenn Ellison, Edward Ludwig Glaeser Journal of Political Economy. 1997. Vol. 105. No. 5. P. 889-927.
This paper discusses the prevalence of Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing industries in the United States. A model in which localized industry-specific spillovers, natural advantages, and random chance contribute to geographic concentration motivates new indices of geographic concentration and coagglomeration. The indices contain controls that facilitate cross-industry and cross-country comparisons. The authors find almost all industries to be more concentrated than a random dart-throwing model predicts but the degree of localization is often slight. They also discuss which industries are concentrated, the geographic scope of localization, coagglomeration patterns, and other topics.
A Reprise of Size and R&D [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Wesley Marc Cohen, Steven Klepper Economic Journal. 1996. Vol. 106. No. 437. P. 925-951.
Numerous studies have shown that, within industries, the propensity to perform R&D and the amount of R&D conducted by performers are closely related to the size of the firm, while R&D productivity declines with firm size. These findings have been widely interpreted to indicate that there is no advantage to large firm size in conducting R&D. The authors show how a simple model based on the idea of R&D cost spreading can explain the prior findings about the R&D-firm size relationship, as well as additional features of the R&D-firm size relationship, implying an advantage to large size in R&D.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Steven Klepper RAND Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 37-61.
After their commercial introduction, the number of producers of autos, tires, televisions, and penicillin initially grew and then experienced a sharp decline or shakeout. Guided by an evolutionary model of entry and exit, firm survival patterns in the four products are examined to determine whether there were common forces governing their distinctive evolution. Predictions concerning the effects of pre- and post-entry experience and the timing of entry on firm survival are tested. The findings are used to reflect on why industries experience shakeouts and evolve to be oligopolies.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Kathryn L. Shaw, Francine Lafontaine Journal of Political Economy. 2007. Vol. 107. No. 5. P. 1041-1080.
This paper provides the first systematic evidence on how franchisors adjust their royalty rates and franchise fees as they gain franchising experience. This evidence comes from a unique panel data set that we assembled on these monetary contract terms for about 1,000 franchisors each year for the 1980-92 period.
Optimal Patent Length and Breadth [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro RAND Journal of Economics. 1990. Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 106-112.
In providing rewards to innovators, there is a tradeoff between patent length and breadth. This article provides conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward for innovation.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Drew Fudenberg, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jean Tirole European Economic Review. 1983. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 3-31.
This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Under some conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘ε-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a firm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until discovery, cant ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D game with random discovery illustrates how ε-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring of rival firms' R&D investment activities.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007A. Colin Cameron, Severin Borenstein, Richard J. Gilbert Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1997. Vol. 112. No. 1. P. 305-39.
The authors test and confirm that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices. Among the possible sources of this asymmetry are production/inventory adjustment lags and market power of some sellers. By analyzing price transmission at different points in the distribution chain, the authors attempt to shed light on these theories. Spot prices for generic gasoline show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes, which may reflect inventory adjustment effects. Asymmetry also appears in the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes, possibly indicating short-run market power among retailers.
Естественная монополия [словарная статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 09-07-2007Игорь Николаевич Баранов Фирма, средние затраты длительного периода которой снижаются на всем диапазоне спроса вследствие возрастающей отдачи от масштаба, является естественной монополией . Таким образом, одна фирма может удовлетворить весь рыночный спрос на товар с меньшими средними затратами, чем те, которые были бы возможны, если бы две или несколько конкурирующих фирм поставляли точно такое же количество товара.
Graduate Industrial Organization: Economics 351 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007Patrick L. Bajari
This is a course intended for Ph.D. students interested in conducting research in empirical microeconomics.
Industrial Organization and Public Policy: 14.20 [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007Nancy L. Rose
This is an undergraduate course in industrial organization, the study of firms in markets. Industrial organization focuses on firm behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, which appear to be far more common than the perfectly competitive markets that were the focus of your basic microeconomics course. This field analyzes the acquisition and use of market power by firms, strategic interactions among firms, and the role of government competition policy. We will approach this subject from both theoretical and applied perspectives.
Industrial Organization I [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007Michael H. Riordan
This Ph.D. course provides an overview of selected topics in industrial organization (IO) economics. Its goal is to survey the main outlines of modern IO, to develop key theoretical ideas, to demonstrate important techniques, to link theory to empirical work, and to relate theoretical and empirical results to policy issues. The course emphasizes theoretical IO, as the empirical side of the field is covered in depth in Industrial Organization II offered in the spring.
Theoretical Industrial Organization: Econ 271A [учебная программа]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007John G. Riley
Elective Doctoral Field course. Topics to be covered in this course will include (1) monopoly and price discrimination; (2) dynamic price competition and tacit collusion; (3) theory of the firm; (4) signaling and limit pricing; (9) auctions and bidding.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Steven Klepper American Economic Review. 1996. Vol. 86. No. 3. P. 562-83.
Regularities concerning how entry, exit, market structure, and innovation vary from the birth of technologically progressive industries through maturity are summarized. A model emphasizing differences in firm innovative capabilities and the importance of firm size in appropriating the returns from innovation is developed to explain the regularities. The model also explains regularities regarding the relationship within industries between firm size and firm innovative effort, innovative productivity, cost, and profitability. It predicts that over time firms devote more effort to process innovation but the number of firms and the rate and diversity of product innovation eventually wither.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2001. Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 25-441.
We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Richard J. Gilbert, David M.G. Newbery American Economic Review. 1982. Vol. 72. No. 3. P. 514-26.
This article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power. The results apply to other situations such as brand identification, spatial location, and capacity expansion, which share the characteristic that early, or preemptive, actions may lower the returns to potential competitors.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007David M.G. Newbery RAND Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 29. No. 4. P. 726-749.
The supply function model of the English electricity spot market is extended to include a contract market and contestable entry, both of which have dramatic effects on the determination of equilibrium. I present an analytically tractable model that can be solved with contracts, variable numbers of competitors, and capacity constraints. In the case of constant marginal costs and linear demand, two outcomes are possible: if new plant is the same as existing plant and incumbents have insufficient capacity, entry will occur, but if new plant has lower variable costs then incumbents can invest to deter entry.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Richard Charles Levin, Wesley Marc Cohen
New York: North-Holland, 1989, cерия "Handbooks in Economics", 2, 986 с.
A central theme of this survey is to emphasize the already perceptible movement of empirical scholars from a narrow concern with the role of firm size and market concentration toward a broader consideration of the fundamental determinants of technical change in industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-06-2007Richard Charles Levin, Peter C. Reiss RAND Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 19. No. 4. P. 538-556.
This article analyzes R&D policies when the returns to cost-reducing and demand-creating R&D are imperfectly appropriable and market structure is endogenous. We generalize previous characterizations of appropriability to permit the possibility that own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes. We also describe how equilibrium expenditures on process and product R&D, as well as equilibrium market structure, depend on technological opportunities and spillovers. In contrast to previous work, diminished appropriability does not necessarily reduce R&D expenditures. For example, under some conditions, an increase in the extent of process (product) spillovers will lead to an increase in product (process) R&D. We estimate several variants of the model by using manufacturing line-of-business data and data from a survey of R&D executives.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-05-2007Светлана Борисовна Авдашева, Андрей Евгеньевич Шаститко, Борис Викторович Кузнецов Российский журнал менеджмента. 2006. Т. 4. № 4. С. 3-22.
В статье суммируются результаты проведенных в России эмпирических исследований, посвященных конкуренции, которые интерпретируются с точки зрения институциональной теории и теории отраслевых рынков. В целом результаты эмпирических исследований показывают, что конкуренция на российских рынках в течение последних 15 лет усиливалась, создавая стимулы к реструктуризации. Многие из накопленных данных свидетельствуют о том, что рост конкуренции приводил к консолидации компаний и увеличению рыночной концентрации. На перспективы развития конкуренции влияют не только внешние факторы, но и внутренняя организация компаний. Преобладающие методы защиты прав собственности объективно ограничивают разнообразие организационных форм российских компаний и в конечном итоге — конкуренцию.